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marketa

Forumer attivo
Fino ad ora di casi concreti ce ne sono stati ben pochi.

Nel primo dei due documenti di S&P's che ho allegato nel post # 9 c'è una cronistoria degli ultimi anni:


Ok.
Non riesco a capire una cosa. Questi famosi Tremonti bond...... ma se una banca aderisce all'iniziativa e quindi li sottoscrive come viene interpretata con i bond hybridi?
 

OdioGliAcronimi

Forumer attivo
Fino ad ora di casi concreti ce ne sono stati ben pochi.

Nel primo dei due documenti di S&P's che ho allegato nel post # 9 c'è una cronistoria degli ultimi anni:

How Have Hybrid Capital Issues Performed?
Apart from the need to do so for our normal rating surveillance purposes, we monitor closely the deferral experience
of rated hybrid capital issues with a view to validating our analytical perspective on hybrid capital issues. Among the
characteristics of such issues, the flexibility of payments (i.e., the contractually permitted ability to defer interest or
dividend payments) is generally the key to our recognition of equity content. Thus, it is important to look at the
extent to which companies under stress actually avail themselves of the option to defer payments. We also seek
validation of our notching policy, since, in setting the rating on hybrid issues, we notch down more than with
conventional subordinated debt, under the assumption that there is incrementally greater payment risk. Under our
rating definitions, if a payment is deferred or omitted, the issue rating would be lowered to 'C' (assuming the issuer
is not bankrupt or insolvent).
Our findings have been mixed.
.......
Also noteworthy is Northern Rock plc. Its preference shares were included in the February 2008 nationalization of
the bank, which meant that ownership mandatorily passed to the U.K. government from the investors. To date, the
investors have not received any compensation. Our rating on this issue is 'D', not the 'C' rating we typically apply
where interest is deferred as permitted in the terms of the agreement. This is because of the forced transfer of the
preference shares to the U.K. government. We believe that any compensation to the original investors will be limited
because it will be based on the estimated worth of the preference shares if Northern Rock had not been supported
by the U.K. authorities. On July 4, 2008, Northern Rock announced that it will not declare or pay a dividend on the
noncumulative preference shares until further notice, and the annual coupon was not paid on that date. Payments on
debt have continued without interruption.

.............


We believe it is unwise to read too much into our historical observations, given limitations of the data and the uptick of deferrals we are seeing in the current environment. While past utilization of the deferral option is less frequent than we might have expected, companies are loath to curtail or eliminate even their common dividends for many of the same reasons cited above–-and the equity-like features of common stock set the standard against which we assess hybrid capital instruments. Perhaps future experiences will be different, given the representations that have been made about the equity benefits of the new generation of hybrids. In the sizable area of hybrid capital of regulated financial institutions, the widespread tendency for bank regulators to favor market discipline may lead to a higher incidence of payment deferral during the next decade compared to the 1995-2006 period. One conclusion we draw is that the deferral feature's value is more tangible in the regulated context and/or where there are mandatory triggers. We expect a higher incidence of coupon deferrals and suspensions on hybrid securities of regulated financial services companies in the future, as the amount of issuance grows. We will continue to track the performance of hybrid capital issues in all sectors to help us gauge the appropriateness of our conclusions regarding equity content and payment risk.


Estremamente interessante! Grazie mille per la info. Se non capisco male, sembrerebbe esserci una differenza sostanziale tra "preference shares" e "junior subordinated bonds". In caso di nazionalizzazione, per le "preference shares" non c'è praticamente speranza. Per quanto riguarda invece le "junior subordinated", non sembrerebbe che neanche Northern Rock li abbia azzerati ? (leggo che "Payments on
debt have continued without interruption.", mentre peraltro nel posting 274 c'era un'informazione potenzialmente contrastante: "When Northern Rock was nationalised in late 2007, much of its Tier 1 was also wiped out.").

Sarebbe interessante capire in maggiore detaglio il caso Northern Rock, che è di fatto ad oggi l' unico caso di nazionalizzazione con azzeramento del titolo (mi chiedo se Alitalia non potrebbe essere un altro caso interessante...)

Un' altra info interessante viene dal Sole 24 Ore di Sabato, dove leggo (spero di aver capito bene) che lo scopo del "Tremonti Bond" sarebbe di andare a contribuire al Core Tier 1 della banca che lo sottoscrivesse: "Per le banche le opzioni diventano 3 .... Sono tre alla fine le versioni del Tremonti Bond al quale le banche potranno ricorrere per rafforzare il capitale di vigilanza Core Tier 1. ..... Le condizioni del "vecchio subordinato" varato dal governo lo scorso Dicambre, infatti, restano in vigore...." Con tabellina a fianco che recita:

"Core Tier 1(%) Target (%) Bond (mln Euro)
Unicredit
6,8 8.0 6.742
Intesa San Paolo
6,4 8.0 6.638
Monte dei Paschi di Siena
6,7 8.0 1.769
................"

In altre parole, non vorrei aver frainteso, è come se tale subordinato non venisse considerato come "debito" bensì come "capitale" ai fini del calcolo del rapporto Core Tier 1. L'intervento "Tremonti" non costituirebbe pertanto un "esproprio" quale sarebbe invece una nazionalizzazione che azzerasse il valore del titolo ordinario?
 

fabios61

Nuovo forumer
ing group

un articolo di blooberg di ieri, visto attraverso il portale di virgilio, diceva che ing group pagherà i perpetual 4 serie, il mio inglese e' pessimo qualcuno vuole confermare. un saluto a tutti
 

negusneg

New Member
Ok.
Non riesco a capire una cosa. Questi famosi Tremonti bond...... ma se una banca aderisce all'iniziativa e quindi li sottoscrive come viene interpretata con i bond hybridi?

(...)Un' altra info interessante viene dal Sole 24 Ore di Sabato, dove leggo (spero di aver capito bene) che lo scopo del "Tremonti Bond" sarebbe di andare a contribuire al Core Tier 1 della banca che lo sottoscrivesse: "Per le banche le opzioni diventano 3 .... Sono tre alla fine le versioni del Tremonti Bond al quale le banche potranno ricorrere per rafforzare il capitale di vigilanza Core Tier 1. ..... Le condizioni del "vecchio subordinato" varato dal governo lo scorso Dicambre, infatti, restano in vigore...." Con tabellina a fianco che recita:

"Core Tier 1(%) Target (%) Bond (mln Euro)
Unicredit
6,8 8.0 6.742
Intesa San Paolo
6,4 8.0 6.638
Monte dei Paschi di Siena
6,7 8.0 1.769
................"

In altre parole, non vorrei aver frainteso, è come se tale subordinato non venisse considerato come "debito" bensì come "capitale" ai fini del calcolo del rapporto Core Tier 1. L'intervento "Tremonti" non costituirebbe pertanto un "esproprio" quale sarebbe invece una nazionalizzazione che azzerasse il valore del titolo ordinario?

Infatti, è proprio così. I Tremonti bond sono obbligazioni perpetue (credo convertibili) Tier 1, e quindi vanno a rafforzare i ratios patrimoniali della banca che li emette.
 

negusneg

New Member
un articolo di blooberg di ieri, visto attraverso il portale di virgilio, diceva che ing group pagherà i perpetual 4 serie, il mio inglese e' pessimo qualcuno vuole confermare. un saluto a tutti

Grazie della segnalazione fabios61 :bow: in effetti è proprio così, Ing ha annunciato che pagherà le cedole di 4 obbligazioni perpetue.

Nell'articolo dice anche che i CDS dei principali emittenti (banche ed assicurazioni) sono saliti a nuovi record per la preoccupazione che la nazionalizzazione degli emittenti possa portare alla cancellazione delle cedole.

Un analista lamenta che "i governi stanno prendendo posizione attivamente in questo mercato e cambiano le regole del gioco. Ciò è molto negativo per il mercato, perchè non sai cosa aspettarti andando avanti."


Bank Bond Risk Soars to Record in Europe on Payment Concerns


By Abigail Moses

Feb. 23 (Bloomberg) -- The cost of protecting bonds sold by European banks and insurers surged to a record on investor concerns that nationalized borrowers will be allowed to skip interest payments.

Credit-default swaps on the benchmark Markit iTraxx Financial index of 25 European banks and insurers climbed 12 basis points to 166 after earlier soaring to an all-time high of 175.5, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. prices at 11:50 a.m. in New York. Contracts on the Markit iTraxx Financial index of subordinated debt rose 10 to 310 after reaching a record 320.

Derivatives dealers today decided not to call a credit event on Bradford & Bingley Plc after the U.K. decided last week to allow the nationalized mortgage lender to defer interest on subordinated bonds. Calling a credit event would have triggered an auction to set the amount to be paid out to investors.

“Governments take active positions in this market and change the rules of the game,” said Folkert Jan Van Der Veer, a credit strategist at Dresdner Kleinwort in London. “That is very negative for the market because you don’t know what to expect going forward.”

Credit-default swaps, contracts conceived to protect bondholders against default, pay the buyer face value in exchange for the underlying securities or the cash equivalent should a company fail to adhere to its debt agreements. An increase signals deterioration in the perception of credit quality.

A basis point on a credit-default swap contract protecting 10 million euros ($12.9 million) of debt from default for five years is equivalent to 1,000 euros a year.

ING Groep NV, the biggest Dutch financial-services company, said yesterday it will pay coupons on four perpetual hybrid securities.

“Even if ING pays coupons, that concern remains for all the other banks and insurance companies,” said Luis Maglanoc, a Munich-based credit strategist at UniCredit SpA.

The following is a list of companies whose subordinated credit-default swaps moved today, according to CMA:

Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc. The Edinburgh-based lender soared 76 basis points to a record 576. The bank, which lost more than half its value this year on bets that shareholders and investors in so-called hybrid bonds and other lower-ranking securities will be wiped out, said it plans to cut costs by more than 1 billion pounds ($1.45 billion) and segregate toxic assets in a new unit as it prepares for a government insurance program to be announced this week, a person familiar with the situation said.

Intesa Sanpaolo SpA. The second-biggest Italian bank increased 40.5 basis points to 273, the highest ever. Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG rose 37.5 to a record 287.5.

Allied Irish Banks Plc. Ireland’s biggest lender by market value soared 149 basis points to a record 1,050. Contracts on Bank of Ireland Plc spiked 121 basis points to a record 1,050, while Anglo Irish Bank Corp. was unchanged at 1,477 basis points.

Assicurazioni Generali SpA. Italy’s biggest insurer climbed 43 basis points to 195. Allianz SE, Europe’s biggest insurer by market value, increased 39 basis points to 182. Contracts on Hanover Re were quoted up 36 basis points at 182 and Aegon NV was 58 higher at 360. Munich Re, the world’s biggest reinsurer, increased 28 to 170 and Zurich Insurance Co. rose 29 to 190.

To contact the reporter on this story: Abigail Moses in London at [email protected]
Last Updated: February 23, 2009 12:53 EST
 

negusneg

New Member
A parte alcune imprecisioni (dove dice "unsecured" secondo me voleva dire "subordinated" :D) segnalo un altro articolo interessante.


Citi, Wells May Offer Way to Profit, After All


Commentary by David Reilly


Feb. 20 (Bloomberg) -- Uncertainty can cause chaos. It can also breed opportunity.

That’s especially true for banks. Questions about stress tests, and how the government will respond to them, have scuttled bank shares, especially those of the big, or final, four -- Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo & Co.

Some preferred stocks and trust preferred securities issued by these same banks have also been hammered. At least one trust preferred issued by Citigroup, for example, has fallen harder since the start of the month than the bank’s stock.

That may be an overreaction. Unlike stock, trust preferred securities are debt, pay a set interest rate and rank above common stock in the pecking order of who gets first dibs on a bank’s or company’s assets in the event of a collapse.

The securities’ swift decline is another sign the government needs to be clearer about its intentions if it hopes to calm financial markets. And it better do it quickly.

In the meantime, the carnage may present an opportunity. At least, that is, for investors with strong stomachs willing to gamble the government will stop short of all-out nationalization, or other moves that hurt more than just common stockholders.

One issue of Citigroup trust preferred securities, or Trups, traded yesterday at about $6, compared with a face value of $25. At that price, the security, which pays a 6.5 percent interest rate, now yields more than 25 percent.

13 Percent Yield

A trust preferred issued by Wells Fargo with a 6.25 percent interest rate traded yesterday at less than $12, giving it a yield of more than 13 percent.

Returns like that don’t come without big risks. Here they revolve around what the government will do to banks and who may get hurt. To understand the extent of the danger, an investor has to consider the totem pole-like ranking of claims on a bank’s assets.

The safest place is atop the pole, a perch occupied by senior debt holders. Just underneath are owners of unsecured debt, often bonds.

Lower down the pole comes equity. First is preferred stock, which has a set face value and pays a fixed dividend. At the very bottom are common stockholders who shoulder the most risk, especially from any government action.

Long Waits

In between the debt and equity sit the trust preferreds, a sort of hybrid. Technically, these securities are debt. A bank can’t stop paying interest on them. But it can postpone the payments for as long as five or 10 years.

The trust preferreds also have a final maturity date like other debt, meaning an investor will ultimately get paid back if the bank doesn’t fail. The maturities are usually 30 years or 60 years out, though, meaning an investor has a long wait.

One troubling possibility for investors is that the government could force banks to defer interest payments. The government might demand this because it wants banks to hold onto their cash, not pay it out to investors.

Citi and BofA, for example, could each generate about $7 billion in capital by doing this and also canceling dividends on preferred stock, according to a Feb. 17 report from research firm CreditSights.


Fortunately for trust preferred holders, postponed interest payments still have to be paid at some time in the future, with interest.

Even better, trust preferreds are higher on the totem pole than all preferred stock, including the government’s. So Uncle Sam would have to forgo his own dividend before the banks could put off paying the trust preferreds.

If the government doesn’t get paid, a political firestorm surely would erupt. At a Congressional hearing last week, chiefs of eight big banks trumpeted their payment of dividends to the Treasury on schedule.

Wiping Out Shareholders

Of course, nationalization or seizure of a bank could wipe out common and preferred stockholders and lead to a restructuring of debt. That could result in big losses for trust preferreds.

It’s questionable, though, whether the government would risk hurting debt holders. This might cause credit markets to again freeze, something the government wants to avoid.

The government may even be leery of hurting preferred stockholders since the decision to eliminate preferred dividends at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led to widespread market dislocation.

That decision, and ensuing losses among banks and mom-and- pop investors, “had a cascading effect all around the financial system,” said Pri de Silva, an analyst at CreditSights. Impairing trust preferreds could cause similar disruptions, especially since many insurance companies are big holders of the securities.


What about other options? Suppose the government pumped more money into troubled banks. That would probably dilute common stockholders. It wouldn’t necessarily hurt trust preferred holders. Any additional capital might even help them because a bank would be stronger.

So while some banks are zombies, there may be investment life left in a limb or two.

(David Reilly is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

To contact the writer of this column: David Reilly at [email protected]
Last Updated: February 20, 2009 00:01 EST
 

marketa

Forumer attivo
Infatti, è proprio così. I Tremonti bond sono obbligazioni perpetue (credo convertibili) Tier 1, e quindi vanno a rafforzare i ratios patrimoniali della banca che li emette.

Sei sicuro che siano perpetue? Io ho letto che se non le rimborsano entro 3/4 anni le condizioni diventano sfavorevoli magari ho capito male o sbaglio. :-?
 

numira

Nuovo forumer
:sad: OGGI -20,73% QUOTAZIONE 26
MENO MALE CHE SI FERMERA' A ZERO :(


Ancora Postbank news

FRANKFURT -(Dow Jones)- Germany's federal cartel office has approved Deutsche Bank AG's (DB) planned purchase of a stake in Deutsche Postbank AG (DPB.XE) from Deutsche Post AG (DPW.XE), according to a statement on the cartel office's Web site.
Deutsche Post owns a 62.3% stake in Postbank and agreed to sell a stake in the bank to Deutsche Bank in a three-part transaction under deal terms reworked in January, with a total value of EUR4.9 billion.
Company Web site: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de; www.db.com; www.dpwn.com
-By William Launder and Ulrike Dauer; Dow Jones Newswires; +49 69 29 725 500; [email protected]
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
 

Yunus80

Del PIG non si butta nulla
Che vadano a rafforzare il Tier 1 era prevedibile, questo però vorrebbe dire che in caso di default il Tesoro sarebbe l'ultimo ad essere pagato... da contribuente, questo non mi piace nemmeno un po' :down:
 
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