stockuccio
Guest
rimane da chiedersi come sia digeribile l'aumento di occupati nel settore determinato dal CES/NET BIRTH DEATH MODEL
.. vabbè tanto il mese prossimo arriva come al solito la revisione 
Macroeconomia Immobiliare USA (residenziale e commerciale) e finanza strutturata (1 Viewer)
- Creatore Discussione Imark
- Data di Inizio
rimane da chiedersi come sia digeribile l'aumento di occupati nel settore determinato dal CES/NET BIRTH DEATH MODEL
.. vabbè tanto il mese prossimo arriva come al solito la revisione 
paologorgo
Chapter 11
After hitting a record high in April, RealtyTrac has announced that the pace of foreclosures has slowed down, and in May dropped by 6%. Nonetheless, “May foreclosure activity was the third-highest month on record, and marked the third straight month where the total number of properties with foreclosure filings exceeded 300,000 — a first in the history of our report,” said James J. Saccacio, chief executive officer of RealtyTrac. “While defaults and scheduled foreclosure auctions were both down from the previous month, bank repossessions, or REOs, were up 2 percent thanks largely to substantial increases in several states, including Michigan, Arizona, Washington, Nevada, Oregon and New York. We expect REO activity to spike in the coming months as foreclosure delays and moratoria implemented by various state laws come to an end.” Ah yes, the dreaded moratorium: interesting how long the Wells Fargo lobby will keep postponing the inevitable collapse.
May foreclosure rates presented below:
Other points of interest from the RealtyTrac report:
Source: RealtyTrac
http://seekingalpha.com/article/142610-foreclosures-slow-down-but-no-sign-of-stopping
May foreclosure rates presented below:
Other points of interest from the RealtyTrac report:
Nevada, California, Florida post top state foreclosure rates
Nevada continued to document the nation’s highest foreclosure rate, with one in every 64 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing during the month — more than six times the national average.
With one in every 144 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing during the month, California posted the nation’s second-highest state foreclosure rate despite a 4 percent decrease in foreclosure activity from the previous month.
Florida posted the third-highest state foreclosure rate in May, with one in every 148 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing during the month.
Arizona posted the fourth-highest state foreclosure rate in May, with one in every 158 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing, and Utah posted the fifth-highest state foreclosure rate, with one in every 316 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing.
Other states with foreclosure rates ranking among the nation’s 10 highest were Michigan, Georgia, Colorado, Idaho and Ohio.
Top 10 states account for nearly 77 percent of total U.S. foreclosure activity
California reported 92,249 properties with foreclosure filings in May, the highest total of any state and up nearly 23 percent from May 2008. Bank repossessions in California were down 1 percent from the previous month and defaults were down 18 percent, but scheduled auctions were up 18 percent.
Default notices, scheduled auctions and bank repossessions in Florida were all down from the previous month, but the state still posted the nation’s second-highest number of properties with foreclosure filings: 58,931, up 50 percent from May 2008.
Nevada documented 17,157 properties with foreclosure filings in May, the third-highest total of any state and up nearly 83 percent from May 2008. A 23 percent increase in bank repossessions helped push Nevada foreclosure activity up 5 percent from the previous month.
Other states with totals among the 10 highest in the country were Arizona (16,865), Michigan (13,891), Ohio (11,360), Illinois (10,942), Georgia (10,516), Texas (9,813) and Virginia (5,385). The top 10 states accounted for nearly 77 percent of total properties with foreclosure filings nationwide.
Nevada continued to document the nation’s highest foreclosure rate, with one in every 64 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing during the month — more than six times the national average.
With one in every 144 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing during the month, California posted the nation’s second-highest state foreclosure rate despite a 4 percent decrease in foreclosure activity from the previous month.
Florida posted the third-highest state foreclosure rate in May, with one in every 148 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing during the month.
Arizona posted the fourth-highest state foreclosure rate in May, with one in every 158 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing, and Utah posted the fifth-highest state foreclosure rate, with one in every 316 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing.
Other states with foreclosure rates ranking among the nation’s 10 highest were Michigan, Georgia, Colorado, Idaho and Ohio.
Top 10 states account for nearly 77 percent of total U.S. foreclosure activity
California reported 92,249 properties with foreclosure filings in May, the highest total of any state and up nearly 23 percent from May 2008. Bank repossessions in California were down 1 percent from the previous month and defaults were down 18 percent, but scheduled auctions were up 18 percent.
Default notices, scheduled auctions and bank repossessions in Florida were all down from the previous month, but the state still posted the nation’s second-highest number of properties with foreclosure filings: 58,931, up 50 percent from May 2008.
Nevada documented 17,157 properties with foreclosure filings in May, the third-highest total of any state and up nearly 83 percent from May 2008. A 23 percent increase in bank repossessions helped push Nevada foreclosure activity up 5 percent from the previous month.
Other states with totals among the 10 highest in the country were Arizona (16,865), Michigan (13,891), Ohio (11,360), Illinois (10,942), Georgia (10,516), Texas (9,813) and Virginia (5,385). The top 10 states accounted for nearly 77 percent of total properties with foreclosure filings nationwide.
Source: RealtyTrac
http://seekingalpha.com/article/142610-foreclosures-slow-down-but-no-sign-of-stopping
stockuccio
Guest
un sacco di articoli interessanti su calculatedrisk ... a chi interessa buona lettura
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/households-with-mortgages-approximately.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/cre-partial-interest-only-loans-coming.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/fed-household-net-worth-off-14-trillion.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/option-arms-paying-98-month-on-350.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/realtytrac-foreclosure-activity-may-hit.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/households-with-mortgages-approximately.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/cre-partial-interest-only-loans-coming.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/fed-household-net-worth-off-14-trillion.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/option-arms-paying-98-month-on-350.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/06/realtytrac-foreclosure-activity-may-hit.html
paologorgo
Chapter 11
Yesterday, we attended Day One of IMN's 10th Anniversary US Real Estate Opportunity & Private Fund Investing Forum in New York City. The event is oriented toward the real estate fund, developer, and LP communities. Conference organizers relayed to us that approximately 900 persons picked up badges yesterday, down approximately 25% from last year, which we believe is a good showing considering the environment. As a point of comparison, we note that Gartner, Inc. (IT) reported that 1Q09 attendees declined 46% Y/Y for 12 events (unchanged Y/Y) to 2,858. Clearly, many persons remain keenly interested in figuring out how to work through current commercial real estate challenges and best participate in distressed opportunities.
The IMN Forum covered virtually all topics facing the commercial real estate industry. Key takeaways include the following: (1) conflicting view that we’re both entering a period of tremendous buying opportunities, yet also a long way from the bottom as mountains of debt come due and can’t be refinanced amidst deteriorating fundamentals; (2) government support to financial institutions could be delaying distressed sales and preventing market clearing prices; (3) reluctance of note holders (e.g. banks) to take losses (related to point #2); (4) property deal flows near all-time lows, although perhaps somewhat better than several months ago; (5) not surprisingly, fundraising is difficult and fund structures are changing; and, (6) well capitalized REITs may be relatively better positioned to lead the way through the next several years.
We’ll expand on our key takeaways following Day Two of the Forum and relay how certain of the key messages extend to public market real estate investing. From a high level, commentary can be applied to REITs across asset classes, including office REITs Boston Properties (BXP) and SL Green (SLG), retail REITs CBL & Associates (CBL) and Pennsylvania REIT (PEI), and multifamily REITs Colonial Properties Trust (CLP) and AvalonBay (AVB).
http://seekingalpha.com/article/142...o-invest-in-distressed-commercial-real-estate
The IMN Forum covered virtually all topics facing the commercial real estate industry. Key takeaways include the following: (1) conflicting view that we’re both entering a period of tremendous buying opportunities, yet also a long way from the bottom as mountains of debt come due and can’t be refinanced amidst deteriorating fundamentals; (2) government support to financial institutions could be delaying distressed sales and preventing market clearing prices; (3) reluctance of note holders (e.g. banks) to take losses (related to point #2); (4) property deal flows near all-time lows, although perhaps somewhat better than several months ago; (5) not surprisingly, fundraising is difficult and fund structures are changing; and, (6) well capitalized REITs may be relatively better positioned to lead the way through the next several years.
We’ll expand on our key takeaways following Day Two of the Forum and relay how certain of the key messages extend to public market real estate investing. From a high level, commentary can be applied to REITs across asset classes, including office REITs Boston Properties (BXP) and SL Green (SLG), retail REITs CBL & Associates (CBL) and Pennsylvania REIT (PEI), and multifamily REITs Colonial Properties Trust (CLP) and AvalonBay (AVB).
http://seekingalpha.com/article/142...o-invest-in-distressed-commercial-real-estate
paologorgo
Chapter 11
lungo, ma interessante. un pezzettino:
As soon as we can stabilize housing, all of our troubles will be solved. This is the mantra we hear night after night on CNBC. The chart below unmistakably paints an abnormal picture of home prices. Karl Case, an economics professor at Wellesley College whose name adorns the S&P Case-Shiller home-price indexes, has studied U.S. house prices going back to the 1890s. Over the long run, he says, home prices tend to increase on average at an inflation-adjusted rate of 2.5% to 3% a year, about the same as per capita income.
The American population has steadily increased from 100 million to 300 million over the last 120 years. Home prices gained at an uneven rate from 1890 until 2000. Then the combination of bubble boy Alan Greenspan, Harvard MBA George Bush, delusional home buyers, criminal investment bankers, pizza delivery boys turned mortgage brokers, and blind regulators led to the greatest bubble in history. Prices doubled in many places in six years versus a 15% expected historical return.
Prices have now declined back within the range seen during the period from the 1970s through the 1990s. This is why the eternal optimists are proclaiming a housing bottom. These people don’t seem to understand the concept of averages. An average is created by prices being above average for a period of time and then below average for a period of time. The current downturn will over correct to the downside. The most respected housing expert on the planet, Robert Shiller, recently gave his opinion on the future of our housing market:
Residential investment and home improvement expenditures have averaged 1.07% of GDP over the last 50 years. This is the 4th time it has peaked above 1.2%. After the three previous peaks it bottomed below 1%. Based on history, it will bottom out at .8% in the middle of the next decade. This would be a reduction of $70 billion in housing investment from the peak. Great news for Home Depot and Lowes.
A housing rebound is a virtual impossibility based on any honest assessment of the facts. Homeowners currently have the least amount of equity in their homes on record. Real-estate Web site Zillow.com said that overall, the number of borrowers who are underwater climbed to 20.4 million at the end of the first quarter from 16.3 million at the end of the fourth quarter. The latest figure represents 21.9% of all homeowners, according to Zillow, up from 17.6% in the fourth quarter and 14.3% in the third quarter. There are 75 million homes in the United States. One third of homeowners have no mortgage, so that means that 41% of all homeowners with a mortgage are underwater. With prices destined for another 10% to 20% drop, the number of underwater borrowers will reach 25 million.
MORTGAGE DEBT
There are over 4 million homes for sale in the U.S. today. This is about one year’s worth of inventory at current sales levels. You can be sure that another one million people would love to sell their homes, but haven’t put their homes on the market. The shills touting their investments on CNBC every day fail to mention the approaching tsunami of Alt-A mortgage resets that will get under way in 2010 and not peak until 2013. These Alt-A mortgages are already defaulting at a 20% rate today. There are $2.4 trillion Alt-A loans outstanding. Alt-A mortgages are characterized by borrowers with less than full documentation, lower credit scores, higher loan-to-values, and more investment properties.
There are more than 2 million Alt-A loans in the U.S. 28 percent of these loans are held by investors who don’t live in the properties they own. That includes interest-only home loans and pay-option adjustable rate mortgages. Option ARMs allow borrowers to pay less than they owe, with the rest added to the principal of the loan. When the debt exceeds a pre-set amount, or after a pre- determined time period has passed, the loan requires a bigger monthly payment.
How can housing return to “normality” with this amount of still toxic debt in the system? It can’t and it won’t.
ALT-A MORTGAGE RESETS
Mortgage delinquencies as a percentage of loans stayed between 2% and 3% from 1979 through 2007. I would categorize this as normal. The Mortgage Bankers Association just reported a delinquency rate of 9.12% on all mortgage loans, the highest since the MBA started keeping records in 1972. Also, the delinquency rate only includes late loans (30-days or more), but not loans in foreclosure. In the first quarter, the percentage of loans in foreclosure was 3.85%, an increase of 55 basis points from the prior quarter and 138 basis points from a year ago. Both the overall percentage and the quarter-to quarter increase are records. The combined percentage of loans in foreclosure and at least one payment late is 12.07%, another record. Delinquencies on subprime mortgage loans rose to 24.95% from 21.88% in the fourth quarter of 2008. Prime loan delinquencies rose to 6.06% from 5.06% one quarter ago, a significant and disturbing increase from a group of borrowers that aren’t expected to default.
With the 30-year mortgage rate approaching 5.7%, mortgage refinancing activity has plunged about 60% in the last two months. Mortgage applications for new home purchases collapsed at a 20% annual rate in May too. Normality in the mortgage market appears to be a few years away.
MORTGAGE DELINQUENCIES AS A % of LOANS
http://seekingalpha.com/article/143010-the-debt-conundrum-part-i
As soon as we can stabilize housing, all of our troubles will be solved. This is the mantra we hear night after night on CNBC. The chart below unmistakably paints an abnormal picture of home prices. Karl Case, an economics professor at Wellesley College whose name adorns the S&P Case-Shiller home-price indexes, has studied U.S. house prices going back to the 1890s. Over the long run, he says, home prices tend to increase on average at an inflation-adjusted rate of 2.5% to 3% a year, about the same as per capita income.
The American population has steadily increased from 100 million to 300 million over the last 120 years. Home prices gained at an uneven rate from 1890 until 2000. Then the combination of bubble boy Alan Greenspan, Harvard MBA George Bush, delusional home buyers, criminal investment bankers, pizza delivery boys turned mortgage brokers, and blind regulators led to the greatest bubble in history. Prices doubled in many places in six years versus a 15% expected historical return.
Prices have now declined back within the range seen during the period from the 1970s through the 1990s. This is why the eternal optimists are proclaiming a housing bottom. These people don’t seem to understand the concept of averages. An average is created by prices being above average for a period of time and then below average for a period of time. The current downturn will over correct to the downside. The most respected housing expert on the planet, Robert Shiller, recently gave his opinion on the future of our housing market:
Residential investment and home improvement expenditures have averaged 1.07% of GDP over the last 50 years. This is the 4th time it has peaked above 1.2%. After the three previous peaks it bottomed below 1%. Based on history, it will bottom out at .8% in the middle of the next decade. This would be a reduction of $70 billion in housing investment from the peak. Great news for Home Depot and Lowes.
A housing rebound is a virtual impossibility based on any honest assessment of the facts. Homeowners currently have the least amount of equity in their homes on record. Real-estate Web site Zillow.com said that overall, the number of borrowers who are underwater climbed to 20.4 million at the end of the first quarter from 16.3 million at the end of the fourth quarter. The latest figure represents 21.9% of all homeowners, according to Zillow, up from 17.6% in the fourth quarter and 14.3% in the third quarter. There are 75 million homes in the United States. One third of homeowners have no mortgage, so that means that 41% of all homeowners with a mortgage are underwater. With prices destined for another 10% to 20% drop, the number of underwater borrowers will reach 25 million.
MORTGAGE DEBT
There are over 4 million homes for sale in the U.S. today. This is about one year’s worth of inventory at current sales levels. You can be sure that another one million people would love to sell their homes, but haven’t put their homes on the market. The shills touting their investments on CNBC every day fail to mention the approaching tsunami of Alt-A mortgage resets that will get under way in 2010 and not peak until 2013. These Alt-A mortgages are already defaulting at a 20% rate today. There are $2.4 trillion Alt-A loans outstanding. Alt-A mortgages are characterized by borrowers with less than full documentation, lower credit scores, higher loan-to-values, and more investment properties.
There are more than 2 million Alt-A loans in the U.S. 28 percent of these loans are held by investors who don’t live in the properties they own. That includes interest-only home loans and pay-option adjustable rate mortgages. Option ARMs allow borrowers to pay less than they owe, with the rest added to the principal of the loan. When the debt exceeds a pre-set amount, or after a pre- determined time period has passed, the loan requires a bigger monthly payment.
How can housing return to “normality” with this amount of still toxic debt in the system? It can’t and it won’t.
ALT-A MORTGAGE RESETS
Mortgage delinquencies as a percentage of loans stayed between 2% and 3% from 1979 through 2007. I would categorize this as normal. The Mortgage Bankers Association just reported a delinquency rate of 9.12% on all mortgage loans, the highest since the MBA started keeping records in 1972. Also, the delinquency rate only includes late loans (30-days or more), but not loans in foreclosure. In the first quarter, the percentage of loans in foreclosure was 3.85%, an increase of 55 basis points from the prior quarter and 138 basis points from a year ago. Both the overall percentage and the quarter-to quarter increase are records. The combined percentage of loans in foreclosure and at least one payment late is 12.07%, another record. Delinquencies on subprime mortgage loans rose to 24.95% from 21.88% in the fourth quarter of 2008. Prime loan delinquencies rose to 6.06% from 5.06% one quarter ago, a significant and disturbing increase from a group of borrowers that aren’t expected to default.
With the 30-year mortgage rate approaching 5.7%, mortgage refinancing activity has plunged about 60% in the last two months. Mortgage applications for new home purchases collapsed at a 20% annual rate in May too. Normality in the mortgage market appears to be a few years away.
MORTGAGE DELINQUENCIES AS A % of LOANS
http://seekingalpha.com/article/143010-the-debt-conundrum-part-i
paologorgo
Chapter 11
Will Commercial Real Estate Crisis Demolish Community Banks?
Sometimes it pays to be late to a story. In this case, the decline in commercial property values probably has a lot to do with the problems community banks appear to be facing which I discussed in the post below.
First, the facts. According to the WSJ, Moody’s Investors Services reported today that its index of commercial real estate property prices fell 8.6% in April (see graph for the trend, click for larger view). With the April fall-off, prices are now down about 25% from last year at this time. The Moody’s survey covers multi-family, office, retail and industrial properties so it’s pretty comprehensive. For the wonkish among you, here is a link that describes Moody's methodology.
That’s bad enough, but now let me share a few comments from Deutsche Bank today on the subject of the commercial real estate market. It comes from Reuters:
This wasn’t supposed to happen. Time and again we’ve heard from government officials, banks and so-called experts that the one fairly bright spot was commercial real estate. It wasn’t supposed to be over built as it was in the 90’s and, yes it would take its lumps, it wouldn’t be one of the real problems in recovery. I guess you throw that one out the window!
For my money, Deutsche Bank has some of the best research and on the ground intelligence to be found in the CRE sector, so I take them pretty much at their word. A lot can happen but they don’t even have to be half right for this to turn into one spectacular crash. In that case, recovery is going to be even slower and more difficult than many have forecast. If residential and commercial construction do not rebound in any significant manner in the next year or two, this country is in for a prolonged period of anemic growth.
I started by referring to the community banks that are having problems paying their TARP funds. Those banks are stuffed to the gills with commercial property loans. I don’t think it’s overstatement to say that if the losses approximate Deutsche Bank’s projections that thousands of banks are going to be compromised to the point of failure.
If memory serves me correctly, I think the S&L bailout cost a bit over $100 billion. I may be low on that number. This one might well be many multiples of that number and could dwarf what we’ve paid out for the big banks. Maybe we need to take a look at what we’re facing before we go all in on health care, more fiscal stimulus, “green” investments and whatever else strikes the fancy of the Washington establishment. I get the feeling we might have to dig deep for some more fundamental problems.
http://seekingalpha.com/article/144783-will-commercial-real-estate-crisis-demolish-community-banks
Sometimes it pays to be late to a story. In this case, the decline in commercial property values probably has a lot to do with the problems community banks appear to be facing which I discussed in the post below.
First, the facts. According to the WSJ, Moody’s Investors Services reported today that its index of commercial real estate property prices fell 8.6% in April (see graph for the trend, click for larger view). With the April fall-off, prices are now down about 25% from last year at this time. The Moody’s survey covers multi-family, office, retail and industrial properties so it’s pretty comprehensive. For the wonkish among you, here is a link that describes Moody's methodology.
That’s bad enough, but now let me share a few comments from Deutsche Bank today on the subject of the commercial real estate market. It comes from Reuters:
The U.S. urban commercial real estate markets probably will not recover until 2017, the head analyst of commercial mortgages for Deutsche Bank Securities (
“The froth is still working itself out,” Richard Parkus, Deutsche Bank head of Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities and Asset-Backed Securities Synthetics Research said at the Reuters Global Real Estate Summit in New York. “We are currently in something which is comparable to what we saw in the 1990s and potentially worse.”
U.S. commercial real estate values could fall by more than 50 percent from the peak in 2007, he said.
Although asking rents are down about 28 percent in New York, factoring in free rent and other perks by landlords, rents are down about 50 percent, Parkus said.
“Rents will be back to where they were in 2017,” Parkus said. Building prices also will take six to eight years to recover, he said.
The U.S. commercial markets are deteriorating at an increasing pace as rent dries up and demand plummets. That is leaving borrowers struggling to make their monthly mortgage payments.
“The number of new loans that are becoming delinquent each month are defaulting at rates between 5 percent and 8 percent per year, with the most loosely underwritten loans of 2007 defaults at 8 percent per year, Parkus said. That puts accumulated losses at about 4 percent this year, and 12 percent over the next four years.
Loans loses ranged between 7 and 11 percent a year during the commercial real estate crash of the early 1990s.
“We are not only not approaching stability, we are at a period of maximum deterioration,” Parkus said.
I usually don’t excerpt an entire column but this one was so short and, at least to me so startling, that I didn’t want to grab pieces or put my own spin on the facts.“The froth is still working itself out,” Richard Parkus, Deutsche Bank head of Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities and Asset-Backed Securities Synthetics Research said at the Reuters Global Real Estate Summit in New York. “We are currently in something which is comparable to what we saw in the 1990s and potentially worse.”
U.S. commercial real estate values could fall by more than 50 percent from the peak in 2007, he said.
Although asking rents are down about 28 percent in New York, factoring in free rent and other perks by landlords, rents are down about 50 percent, Parkus said.
“Rents will be back to where they were in 2017,” Parkus said. Building prices also will take six to eight years to recover, he said.
The U.S. commercial markets are deteriorating at an increasing pace as rent dries up and demand plummets. That is leaving borrowers struggling to make their monthly mortgage payments.
“The number of new loans that are becoming delinquent each month are defaulting at rates between 5 percent and 8 percent per year, with the most loosely underwritten loans of 2007 defaults at 8 percent per year, Parkus said. That puts accumulated losses at about 4 percent this year, and 12 percent over the next four years.
Loans loses ranged between 7 and 11 percent a year during the commercial real estate crash of the early 1990s.
“We are not only not approaching stability, we are at a period of maximum deterioration,” Parkus said.
This wasn’t supposed to happen. Time and again we’ve heard from government officials, banks and so-called experts that the one fairly bright spot was commercial real estate. It wasn’t supposed to be over built as it was in the 90’s and, yes it would take its lumps, it wouldn’t be one of the real problems in recovery. I guess you throw that one out the window!
For my money, Deutsche Bank has some of the best research and on the ground intelligence to be found in the CRE sector, so I take them pretty much at their word. A lot can happen but they don’t even have to be half right for this to turn into one spectacular crash. In that case, recovery is going to be even slower and more difficult than many have forecast. If residential and commercial construction do not rebound in any significant manner in the next year or two, this country is in for a prolonged period of anemic growth.
I started by referring to the community banks that are having problems paying their TARP funds. Those banks are stuffed to the gills with commercial property loans. I don’t think it’s overstatement to say that if the losses approximate Deutsche Bank’s projections that thousands of banks are going to be compromised to the point of failure.
If memory serves me correctly, I think the S&L bailout cost a bit over $100 billion. I may be low on that number. This one might well be many multiples of that number and could dwarf what we’ve paid out for the big banks. Maybe we need to take a look at what we’re facing before we go all in on health care, more fiscal stimulus, “green” investments and whatever else strikes the fancy of the Washington establishment. I get the feeling we might have to dig deep for some more fundamental problems.
http://seekingalpha.com/article/144783-will-commercial-real-estate-crisis-demolish-community-banks
paologorgo
Chapter 11
Mi sa che sei il mio unico lettore...
riporto anche questo, perchè mi aveva colpito, e perchè la zona (Irvine) era un piccolo paradiso, anni fa, anche per la qualità della vita. Riflessione collegata: con tutti i fallimenti in corso, che inevitabilmente hanno come effetto collaterale il filing di un reject per le lease (o una rinegoziazione al ribasso dell'affitto, se va bene...), tira davvero una brutta aria, e paradossalmente ancora di più per chi avesse immobili usati da banche, etc., che quando vengono chiuse dalla FDIC non ci sono più regole e diritti...
SoCal Office Building Sold For 60% Of Cost
Ouch! Maguire Properties, a beleagured Los Angeles real estate investment trust, just sold a brand new building in Irvine, Ca. for $160 million, about 60% of its construction cost.The WSJ reports that the Emmes Group of Cos., a New York real estate investment firm, bought the property for about $300 a square foot. The estimated construction cost is $500 a foot. The property is currentlyabout 60% leased. The deal was financed by EuroHypo AG with a loan of $125 million. EuroHypo was the construction lender on the building and had extended a $165 million construction loan.
An ironic note to the deal is that the original anchor tenant was to have been New Century Financial, one of the biggest subprime mortgage companies. It cratered before the building was completed.
When commercial real estate starts selling at replacement cost versus a multiple of expected future net operating income you have a really sick market. I've seen a lot of estimates of discounts of 30% to 40% off of the purchase price for commercial properties that have been sold in the last three or four years. That might be too conservative given this transaction.
All real estate is local so it's a mistake to extrapolate too much with this deal. Maguire might be desperate, Irvine might be a dog market (it is right now) or the property may be poorly designed. Discounting all of that, I'm still left with the opinion that commercial real estate is about to get crushed.
http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/183730-tom-lindmark/9249-socal-office-building-sold-for-60-of-cost
samantaao
Forumer storico
Mi sa che sei il mio unico lettore...
anch'io leggo con la coda dell'occhio, ovvio che x le mie capacità spero almeno di intuire il succo
... ma di contributo non ne posso proprio dare
anche perchè c'è un etf che galleggia su quello che sembra un minimo... ma forse non lo è
paologorgo
Chapter 11
anch'io leggo con la coda dell'occhio, ovvio che x le mie capacità spero almeno di intuire il succo
anche perchè c'è un etf che galleggia su quello che sembra un minimo... ma forse non lo è
ciao carlo, quale è l'ETF? (io tendo di più a guardare a ditte singole...)
effetti collaterali dei numerosi fallimenti nel retail, nelle parole del CEO di un REIT:
>>Michael Bilerman – Citi
How prevalent are rent relief requests from tenants these days.
Tom Lewis
I would say in the last month or so I haven’t heard as much about it, but it was very prevalent towards the end of the fourth quarter and its interesting because I think what happened is there were a few, actually a lot of Chapter 11 in retail, not for us, but generically last year and we keep a chart of them and it was a big number, and as part of those everybody who goes into a Chapter 11 in retail hires the same three or four firms to go and get rent relief.
And they’ll go to the mall owners or whoever it is that’s their landlord and say, gee things are tough and we’re going to have to renegotiate some rent. And what typically happens if you’re a larger landlord you’re aware of how your units are doing, or what the profitability is and your reaction is, we own your more profitable units, there aren’t going to be rent reductions.
However what did work last year for a lot of retailers was going back and if they had some one-off owners of buildings, particularly when they had mortgage financing on it and saying, look we may have a problem here if you can’t cut rent. If they could get some knowledge of what the one-off owners’ payments were, I think there was some success in getting that person to do a rent reduction.
And so just like REIT industry when a couple of people do something and you go to an AREIT meeting and everybody hears about it on a panel, I think in retail last year everybody went to the retail conferences and three guys from these companies that try and get rent reductions got up on a panel and then we got a whole bunch of phone calls and basically said, our units are profitable the answer is no.
So I think that was a trend but it was really a trend towards the end of the last year and it really moderated coming into the first quarter.