Macroeconomia Immobiliare USA (residenziale e commerciale) e finanza strutturata (1 Viewer)

stockuccio

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More bad news for holders of securities backed by Alt-A mortgages, which are supposed to be almost as safe as prime loans.
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services Tuesday lowered its ratings on 226 classes from 34 residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions backed by U.S. Alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgage loan collateral issued between 2002 and 2004. “We removed 55 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications. We also affirmed our ratings on 235 classes from the 34 downgraded transactions and four additional Alt-A deals. We removed 19 of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch with negative implication.”
The downgrades reflect our opinion that projected credit support for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous ratings, given our current projected losses, because of increases in delinquencies and the current negative condition of the housing market.
 

paologorgo

Chapter 11
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - More than one-quarter of homeowners receiving help under a U.S. government foreclosure prevention plan are behind on their new mortgage payments, a Treasury Department survey has found.
Some 650,000 borrowers are participating in the trial phase of the Obama administration's Home Affordable Modification Program, a $75 billion taxpayer-financed program launched this year.
Most home loan modifications result in lower monthly payments, although some lead to reduced principal on mortgages.
Trial modifications were initially for three months, but the Treasury added 60 days, effectively making them last five months.
Homeowners must submit more detailed documentation before they can have their loan modifications made permanent.
A Treasury Department survey of large mortgage servicers found "over 73 percent of borrowers are current in their trial plan payments," Assistant Treasury Secretary Herbert Allison told a congressional oversight panel.
That leaves about 27 percent who are delinquent on the payments.
Allison provided written answers to questions raised at an October hearing before the Congressional Oversight Panel, which monitors the government's foreclosure prevention plan and other financial rescue efforts.
Allison said that "while not all eligible borrowers will convert to permanent modifications, it is too early to estimate a failure rate, diagnose causes and predict future success rates."
Experts say the conversion rate to permanent loans is the key to determining the program's ultimate success or failure.
The Treasury has not published figures on how many trial loan modifications have been made permanent, but it said it will start doing so this month.
The next monthly report on the program will be released next week, Treasury Department spokeswoman Meg Reilly said.
This week Treasury officials threatened to fine mortgage lenders unless they speed efforts to give hard-pressed homeowners a permanent break on monthly payments.
According to a report from the congressional oversight panel, only 1,711 permanent mortgage modifications had been offered as of September 1, an indication of how reluctant banks seemed to move beyond trial offers.
(Reporting by Lisa Richwine; Editing by Xavier Briand)

Quarter in U.S. foreclosure plan late on payments | Reuters
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Come funzionava la catena delle cartolarizzazioni... nuovi dettagli nell'analisi di F. Salmon.

How Smaller Banks Would Have Helped Shrink the CDO Market -- Seeking Alpha

How Smaller Banks Would Have Helped Shrink the CDO Market

The WSJ has new details on how banks would pass CDO risk between each other in an improbably long chain:
One of Goldman’s trades with AIG involved a financial vehicle called South Coast Funding VIII. South Coast was one of many pools of bonds backed by individual homeowners’ mortgage payments that Wall Street turned into collateralized debt obligations or CDOs.
Merrill Lynch, now part of Bank of America Corp., underwrote the South Coast CDO in January 2006 by stuffing it with packages of home loans originated by firms such as Countrywide Financial Corp., the big California lender.
Once a CDO debt pool is assembled, it is sliced into layers based on risk and return. Merrill sold the safest, or top layer, of deals like South Coast to large banks, including in Europe and Canada.
The banks wanted protection in case the housing market tanked. Many turned to Goldman, which effectively insured the securities against losses. Then, to cover its own potential losses, Goldman bought protection from AIG, in the form of credit-default swaps.
The risk, here, originated with Countrywide. It then got moved to South Coast Funding, whence it moved to Merrill Lynch, and thence to European banks, who sold it on to Goldman Sachs (GS), who in turn passed it on to AIG (AIG). When the music stopped, AIG bore the brunt of the losses.
The obvious question here is why the chain was so long: why couldn’t Merrill (or even Countrywide) just insure the mortgages with AIG itself, instead of sending them off on a long and winding road to end up in the same place?
There’s actually a good answer to the question. Countrywide considered itself to be in the originate-to-distribute business, it didn’t want an exploding balance sheet. So it was very happy to sell its mortgages to the likes of South Coast Funding and book the profits immediately. South Coast Funding, in turn, had no real equity of its own, it was just a special-purpose vehicle set up by Merrill Lynch. And Merrill considered itself to be in the moving business rather than the storage business, so it wanted to sell as much of the debt as it could.
Eventually, the bonds ended up with big European and Canadian banks, who were attracted by their triple-A credit ratings: under Basel II, that meant they needed to hold very little capital against them. Crucially, it was these banks, who had no size limits, which were happy expanding their balance sheet as much as they could, so long as that meant extra profits. They even managed to bring their risk down near zero by getting Goldman to insure the credit.
Finally, Goldman was basically in the trading business, insuring CDOs only if and when it knew that it could get someone else (in this case, AIGFP) to reinsure the risk at a lower rate; eventually the European banks got wise to that trade, and started dealing directly with AIG themselves.
There’s a lot of blame to go around here, but right at the heart of it is the fact that there were no limits on the size of banks’ balance sheets. The European banks (and, later, once AIG stopped insuring this stuff, Merrill Lynch itself) would happily balloon up as large as they could with stuff like this, because sheer size was one of the profitable attributes that regulators didn’t mind in the slightest. If there were a cap on size, this chain would have been much harder to construct.
 

samantaao

Forumer storico
Problemi in vista per il mattone
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Morningstar - 16/12/2009 15:20:00
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Nel 2010 in Usa scadranno molti mutui commerciali. E non tutti i debiti saranno onorati. Il comparto immobiliare tiene ma, avvertono gli analisti, si prepara a un difficile 2010. L'indice Msci del settore nell'ultimo mese (fino al 16 dicembre e calcolato in euro) ha guadagnato il 2,7%, portando a +20,5% la performance da inizio anno.

"La fiducia che fra alti e bassi si respira sui mercati sta facendo bene anche al mattone", spiega una nota di Morningstar. "I problemi, tuttavia, non sono ancora finiti e, l'anno prossimo, bisognerà farci i conti". Anche questa volta, le difficoltà partiranno dagli Stati Uniti. Circa 1.500 miliardi di dollari di mutui per l'edilizia commerciale americana, infatti, nel 2010 andranno in scadenza. Ma molti sottoscrittori hanno già fatto sapere che non saranno in grado di onorare gli impegni. Per questo stanno cercando con grosse difficoltà di rifinanziare il debito e sperano in un intervento del governo (simile a quello attuato per salvare le banche) per risolvere la situazione.

L'amministrazione Usa - e in particolare Tesoro e Federal Reserve - hanno tuttavia già lasciato intendere che non intendono intervenire nuovamente sul mercato. "Una soluzione per molte società immobiliari potrebbe essere quella di quotarsi in Borsa e intascare i soldi dell'Ipo", continua la nota. "Una situazione simile si è già vista all'inizio degli anni '90, quando i prezzi del mattone sono crollati". Per quanto riguarda il settore abitativo, secondo gli ultimi dati rilasciati dal Dipartimento del commercio, la costruzione di nuove case ha novembre è cresciuta dell'8,9%, rispetto allo stesso mese dell'anno scorso.

Problemi potrebbero registrarsi anche nel settore immobiliare europeo. Ad attivare la sirena è stata Kate Baker, personaggio influente della Bank of England che si è detta sorpresa dal rimbalzo dei prezzi delle abitazioni registrato negli ultimi mesi. Secondo i dati della società di consulenza Rightmove, il valore degli immobili da gennaio è cresciuto del 4%. Merito, ha spiegato la Baker della diminuzione della disoccupazione.

"Tuttavia, la situazione sul fronte del lavoro l'anno prossimo potrebbe deteriorarsi ancora. Questo porterà ad una stagnazione dei prezzi", ha detto il membro della BoE. Lo stesso potrebbe accadere nel resto del Vecchio continente, visto che, di solito, l'andamento del mattone in Gran Bretagna anticipa quello europeo.

In Asia gli esperti tengono d'occhio soprattutto la Cina che, dal punto di vista immobiliare, nell'ultimo trimestre è stata una delle regioni peggiori a livello globale. La situazione è complicata dall'intenzione del governo di reintrodurre la tassa sulle rivendite di case effettuate entro cinque anni dall'acquisto. Precedentemente il limite era stato abbassato a due anni.

Gli operatori, tuttavia, sono ottimisti. "Il mercato ha già digerito il rischio di un intervento della politica nel settore delle abitazioni", spiega uno studio della società di consulenza CLSA Asia Pacific Markets. "In generale il comparto immobiliare godrà di buona salute, grazie alla crescita economica del Paese che spingerà sempre più persone a investire nel mattone".
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Broker88

Senior Member
L'immobiliare USA ancora in coma profondo...

Us market mover: -11,3% vendita di case nuove a novembre, sotto attese

Il dato di novembre si attesta a quota 355 mila unità. Gli analisti si attendevano un valore pari a 440 mila unità rispetto alle 430 mila unità di ottobre.
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Continuano a cedere i prezzi dell'immobiliare commerciale USA rilevati da Moody's ad ottobre 2009: siamo a -36,4% in un anno e a -43,7% dal picco di circa due anni fa. Alcuni altri dati nel breve commento al report (disponibile solo a pagamento).

Moody's: US commercial real estate price decline slows in October


New York, December 21, 2009 -- Commercial real estate prices as measured by Moody's/REAL Commercial Property Price Indices (CPPI) dropped 1.5% in October, as the pace of monthly declines continued to moderate. U.S. commercial property values are now down 36.4% from a year ago, and 43.7% from the peak in prices two years ago.

"The pace of declines has tapered off since the large drops measured in April and May," says Moody's Managing Director Nick Levidy. "However, further declines are anticipated."

Commercial real estate transactions have been holding steady at reduced volumes throughout 2009, with a small increase recorded in October. During the month there were 407 sales, the second highest monthly total for 2009, and a dollar volume of $5.4 billion, the highest for the year.

Annual indices for the four quarters ending September 30, 2009, show poor performance in New York over the past year dragging down the eastern office market overall. New York offices saw the largest annual price declines among the three MSA-level office indices in the CPPI. Office prices in New York fell 38.1% over the past four quarters, and have dropped 39.3% overall.

In all, office prices in the East fell 37.3% annually and are now 40.6% from the peak.

Commercial real estate prices are showing their worst performance in the South, where three of the four property types in the CPPI (apartment, industrial, office and retail) recorded annual declines greater than 30%. Apartments in the South saw prices being cut in half over the past year.

Southern California properties saw relatively mild price declines with no property type measuring an annual decline above 30%.

Prices on Florida apartments have been falling for the past three years. This year, they plummeted 46.1%, Moody's reports. Florida apartment values are now 51.6% below their peak.

The CPPI

Moody's/REAL Commercial Property Indices are based on the repeat sales of the same properties across the US at different points in time. Applying price changes measured in this way provides maximum transparency and methodological rigor. This approach also circumvents the distortions that can occur with other commercial property value measurements such as appraisals or average prices, says Moody's.

The report, "Moody's/REAL Commercial Property Price Indices, December 2009," is available on the company's website, OpenDNS.
 

Kylix

Forumer attivo
Son bravi a far finta di niente. Qui a San Francisco da "uomo della strada" la crisi USA e della California in particolare non la percepisco assolutamente.:)
 

stockuccio

Guest
Son bravi a far finta di niente. Qui a San Francisco da "uomo della strada" la crisi USA e della California in particolare non la percepisco assolutamente.:)

nessun problema in California :D:D


1.8 Million California Mortgages Underwater. In 2008 100,000 Renters were added. 2010 California Housing Market Trends. How Banks Hoodwinked the Public into Believing the Bailouts were to help the Housing Market.



As we wind the year down the California housing market is entering a new chapter in its bubble saga. 2009 brought many new factors to consider in how the housing correction will play out. One major trend was the growing number of moratoriums. These programs largely failed at preventing foreclosure and only pushed the inevitable down the road creating a cryogenic toxic mortgage. The growing number of shadow inventory has been mounting as well. A few articles appeared in the L.A. Times and O.C. Register discussing this topic. Hopefully we’ll see some opinion pieces discussing how shady bank practices are when banks claim housing numbers look good when they know that the numbers on the books state otherwise. As of today, on the eve of a new year, roughly 1,800,000 mortgages in California sit underwater. That is, the home backing the mortgage is not even worth the current balance.
This is hard for people to imagine. Recent annual data from 2008 showed that California added 100,000+ new renters in 2008. When the 2009 data is released late in 2010 we should expect a similar trend. 2009 saw a record number of notice of defaults filed:

So 2009 was the worst year for California housing if we consider people not paying their mortgage as a significant criteria. And the above chart is largely responsible for the growing number of shadow inventory. In a typical foreclosure process, after a notice of default is filed a home will be taken back in 3 to 6 months. Take for example the 135,000 notice of defaults filed in Q1 of 2009. With a cure rate of 3 to 5 percent according to recent reports we would expect 128,000+ of these homes to be taken back in Q3 of 2009 by the bank. How many foreclosures occurred? 50,000. Now this isn’t a new trend or something that is shocking. In fact, with the HAMP initiative it has become a formalized process. Yet HAMP has only converted some 4 percent of trial modifications to permanent status (they have extended the deadline to the end of January as if this was going to miraculously boost the numbers). Plus, we have yet to see drilled down statewide data. California also has toxic mortgages like option ARMs and Alt-A products that largely do not qualify for HAMP. Many of the option ARMs recast in 2010.
But let us look at the overall California market:

California has an extremely large renting population. In 2008 we saw a massive shift of 100,000 additional renters. This number almost perfectly correlates with the 91,000+ drop of homes with a mortgage. In 2008 California had almost the same number of renters as homeowners with a mortgage. It is a safe bet that in 2009 we have more renters than homeowners with a mortgage. I hesitate to call someone with massive negative equity a homeowner. Of those with a mortgage, nearly 2 million owe more than what their home is worth. They are worse off than a renter.
Banks have been playing this absurd game with taxpayer money. Since the recession started we have seen trillions of banking subsidies and direct bailouts. Yet here we are with foreclosures still near their peak and the economy still in the dumps:

Matthew Padilla at the O.C. Register has a chart showing the growth of the shadow inventory:

Source: OC Register
So what are we looking at above? While foreclosures in Orange County have been steadily dropping loans that are 90+ days late are now at a record high! In other words, banks have been covering up their eyes and pretending everything is okay. This is the nonsense that is called a “solution” to the current problem. If ignoring a serious issue like this is good news then a gambler should keep on gambling even if he is in the hole for millions. This is the shadow inventory. We have never been in a situation like this. It is the height of stupidity to give banks the authority to resolve this mess when they are largely the culprits of bringing down our economy. With the trillions banks have received we could have paid off every single mortgage in the U.S. But as you have figured out by now the bailouts were never about helping the public. The bailouts were to protect the entrenched crony interests of Wall Street.
It is amazing that government policy is only now starting to connect the fact that the employment situation is so dismal and that may be a reason for the continued problems with housing. I tend to believe that D.C. and Wall Street are now one in the same so they already knew this and sold the bailouts as assistance for the people. That has been a major sham. Early reports on HAMP show that the process is laborious and painstaking for those trying to get a modification. You mean the same people that made $500,000 mortgages with your cat as a co-signer in 24 hours are no longer able to rush through paperwork? The banks are largely lagging because they already have taxpayer money so what is the big rush? They can simply go back to gambling on Wall Street while the real economy looks like this:

The California unemployment rate went from 8.7 percent in December of 2008 to 12.3 percent today. Without a doubt this has something to do with the 90+ days late jumping off the charts. What use is modifying a mortgage if you have no job? Yet this has been the tunnel vision policy of our government since December of 2007 and we continue to allow Wall Street to write the path forward. The PR machine is going heavy that things are now dandy because the stock market is up 60+ percent but the reality is much different. Foreclosures are still sky high and hiring is still anemic.
Is it any wonder why so many loans are underwater in California? Maybe the market is trying to say something that prices are still too high given the current economy of the state. We are going to start the year off with a $21 billion budget deficit. How is this good for housing but more importantly the economy? Banks will continue to rip people off and drain taxpayer money because nothing has come in the way of solid reform. There is a commission that is finally going to look into the causes of this crisis but findings won’t be out until late in 2010! First, banks and Wall Street are the primary causes of this crisis thanks to their bedfellow the Federal Reserve which serves as a pseudo-government agency to funnel money into the banking and financial sector. Alan Greenspan dropping rates to 1 percent juiced the housing market completely. Would people be buying homes if mortgages were 10 percent? They’d think twice. Plus, the easy interest free money was more a gift to Wall Street to gamble in the global stock markets. One argument goes “well people should know better than to borrow $500,000 from a bank.” Poor bank. How about we only allow the bank to lend their money and let us see if they still make those loans with zero government backing. Something tells me lending standards would change overnight.
Are people to blame as well? Absolutely. But many are paying the price with job losses and foreclosures. They are taking their knocks. Yet Wall Street has siphoned off every penny from the taxpayer to ensure that they don’t lose any money in this downturn. They talk about moral hazard when it comes to the public but when it comes time for their punishment they like to pull the hypocrite card out.
And things are going so good that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are having their caps pushed upwards. Turns out losses are just pouring in. Do you remember the gall of these people telling us we were somehow going to turn a profit on this? This was the ultimate sucker play. If banks had to make mortgages with their own money you can rest assured the interest rate would be somewhere between 8 and 10 percent and they would be limiting who they lend money too (I would assume a more sizeable down payment as well). But instead, banks with their horrible underwriting standards are actually dishing out government backed loans with artificially low rates. These are the loans that are now imploding. Banks don’t give a crap since they don’t hold the note. So if this is the case, why do we even need the bank? Why not have the government make the loan directly to the public? Because banks want to suck every nickel out of your wallet.
So until we get any real reform we can expect to live in a 1984 like world where we hear propaganda that the economy is fine and housing is recovering. Don’t worry, after all banks were in charge this decade and look how well things went.


 

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