Parmalat (PLT) I promessi sposi: Lucia Parmalat e Renzo Lactalis (1 Viewer)
- Creatore Discussione salcatal
- Data di Inizio
salcatal
Come i Panda
Sono sincero, mai usato i derivati sugli indici.
Mi indichi quale strumento usi?
Penso, fra l'altro, di non essere abilitato con Fineco per operare sui futures.
Dovrò farmi abilitare.
storm
Forumer storico
forse devi mandare una integrazione contrattuale. Ti consiglio di usare i future e mai gli etf per lo short. Io uso il fib e qualche volta l'eurostox. Quelli settoriali come l'indice bancario non li uso mai perchè cmq se scendono i bancari il fib scende sempre a piombo.
Ovviamente devi sempre essere capitalizzato in proporzione all'investimento.
Un fib con l'indice a 14000 equivale a 70000 io uso margine a 25% per non avere sorprese. Cmq a mio parere se usi un fib i 70000 sul conto o in bond li devi avere oltre a 25000 di margine. Altrimenti usi il mini se vuoi iniziare con qualcosa di più tranquillo 14000 euro di controvalore.
salcatal
Come i Panda
Buongiorno e buon week end.
Effettivamente per operare sui futures devo fare l'integrazione contrattuale.
In ogni caso sul versante dei mercati va fatta qualche considerazione.
Giovedì i mercati hanno visto il bicchiere mezzo vuoto e venerdì lo hanno visto mezzo pieno o forse pieno a 3/4.
Anche noi, intendo io e Storm, abbiamo riconsiderato tra giovedì sera e venerdì mattina la portata dell'intervento di Draghi, cogliendo aspetti positivi che erano sfuggiti a una prima lettura.
Allora sarà il caso di chiedersi se il bicchiere e' mezzo pieno o mezzo vuoto.
Una rilettura a freddo della situazione mi porta a dire, purtroppo, che il bicchiere e' mezzo vuoto.
Il perché il bicchiere sia mezzo vuoto e' facile da intuire.
Infatti il sistema messo in piedi, almeno quello che traspare dalle parole di Draghi, potrebbe funzionare solo se i mercati si convincessero che la BCE sia disposta ad intervenire sui mercati, in caso di necessita', senza limiti quantitativi, sopperendo così ai noti limiti di risorse a disposizione dei vari fondi salva stati.
Ora chiunque vede che questo non e' possibile, in quanto un intervento massiccio della BCE sui mercati incontrerebbe la ferma opposizione dei tedeschi, in primis, ma anche degli altri paesi, tra i quali probabilmente anche la Francia almeno fin quando quest'ultima beneficerà, a dispetto della sua disastrosa situazione finanziaria, dell'appartenenza al club dei paesi che si finanzia a tassi negativi.
Quindi aspettiamoci altre tempeste sui mercati determinate da attacchi volti a far emergere le profonde spaccature che esistono fra i vari paesi europei, spaccature determinate dagli interessi, e' il caso di dirlo, fortemente divergenti.
In sintesi io sono ribassista nel medio termine.
Effettivamente per operare sui futures devo fare l'integrazione contrattuale.
In ogni caso sul versante dei mercati va fatta qualche considerazione.
Giovedì i mercati hanno visto il bicchiere mezzo vuoto e venerdì lo hanno visto mezzo pieno o forse pieno a 3/4.
Anche noi, intendo io e Storm, abbiamo riconsiderato tra giovedì sera e venerdì mattina la portata dell'intervento di Draghi, cogliendo aspetti positivi che erano sfuggiti a una prima lettura.
Allora sarà il caso di chiedersi se il bicchiere e' mezzo pieno o mezzo vuoto.
Una rilettura a freddo della situazione mi porta a dire, purtroppo, che il bicchiere e' mezzo vuoto.
Il perché il bicchiere sia mezzo vuoto e' facile da intuire.
Infatti il sistema messo in piedi, almeno quello che traspare dalle parole di Draghi, potrebbe funzionare solo se i mercati si convincessero che la BCE sia disposta ad intervenire sui mercati, in caso di necessita', senza limiti quantitativi, sopperendo così ai noti limiti di risorse a disposizione dei vari fondi salva stati.
Ora chiunque vede che questo non e' possibile, in quanto un intervento massiccio della BCE sui mercati incontrerebbe la ferma opposizione dei tedeschi, in primis, ma anche degli altri paesi, tra i quali probabilmente anche la Francia almeno fin quando quest'ultima beneficerà, a dispetto della sua disastrosa situazione finanziaria, dell'appartenenza al club dei paesi che si finanzia a tassi negativi.
Quindi aspettiamoci altre tempeste sui mercati determinate da attacchi volti a far emergere le profonde spaccature che esistono fra i vari paesi europei, spaccature determinate dagli interessi, e' il caso di dirlo, fortemente divergenti.
In sintesi io sono ribassista nel medio termine.
Ultima modifica:
storm
Forumer storico
A proposito del bicchiere mezzo vuoto...
Ottimo articolo:
In Order To Be Saved, Spain And Italy Must First Be Destroyed | ZeroHedge
Fai l'integrazione per i future. Sono il modo più efficiente per operare sui mercati. Purtroppo creano dipendenza....
Il fib è una droga...
Ottimo articolo:
In Order To Be Saved, Spain And Italy Must First Be Destroyed | ZeroHedge
Fai l'integrazione per i future. Sono il modo più efficiente per operare sui mercati. Purtroppo creano dipendenza....
Il fib è una droga...
Ultima modifica:
storm
Forumer storico
ft.com > comment > blogs >
Gavyn Davies
Welcome [email protected] Your account Site tour Sign out
Draghi breaks the ultimate euro taboo
August 5, 2012 4:14 pm by Gavyn Davies
7
When Mario Draghi said on 26 July that a “convertibility risk” was preventing the smooth functioning of the ECB’s monetary policy across national borders inside the eurozone, he was breaking a taboo which has been stubbornly followed by all of his predecessors in the project to create a durable single currency. (See Alphaville here.) That taboo is that no-one in the ECB should ever admit that the euro might break apart. The objective of the taboo (which admittedly has previously been broken in the “special case” of Greece) has always been to ensure that markets should not feel the need to reflect any concerns about possible foreign exchange risk among the member states which comprise the euro.
By admitting that this “convertibility risk” now exists, the ECB president has implicitly acknowledged that the permanence of the single currency is not fully credible in the financial markets. The recognition of redenomination risk after a potential devaluation is one reason, he implies, why sovereign bond yields are now so high in Spain and Italy. He has said that this prevents the ECB from transmitting its intended monetary stance into those economies, which gives the ECB the right to take direct action to reduce these bond yields.
After last Thursday’s ECB meeting, it appears that this direct action will be to purchase short dated government bonds in Spain and Italy, provided that these governments have previously applied for support from the EFSF/ESM mechanism, and have accepted any conditions attached. The question is whether this action will be enough to put the convertibility genie back into the bottle.
Until Mr Draghi’s recent remarks, the ECB’s line on convertibility risk was that the different members of the eurozone should be treated like the different districts of the Federal Reserve system in the US. In other words, they should be seen as the component parts of a single payments union, where the value of the euro is guaranteed to be the same throughout the eurozone. The bedrock of this guarantee is our old friend the ECB’s Target 2 payments system, which ensures that payments made in euros by solvent and liquid entities will always clear, wherever they are made within the eurozone. By this means, the ECB ensures that the market does not need to worry that a Greek or Spanish euro will ever be worth less than a German euro.
What lies behind this guarantee is, however, an obscure mechanism which in effect means that the national central banks of the strong economies (eg the Bundesbank) are offering to extend a potentially unlimited amount of credit to the central banks of the weaker economies (eg the Bank of Spain) in order to ensure that the monetary union stays intact.
They in fact do this via the ECB balance sheet, which stands between the Bundesbank and the Bank of Spain. But this does not alter the basic fact that the original design of the euro did not take into account the strains which would be placed on this mechanism if a country like Spain were to run a large and persistent balance of payments deficit (on current and private capital account) against Germany, which is what has been happening.
A balance of payments deficit means that Spanish residents are making larger outgoing payments to (say) Germany than German residents are making to them. Since 2008, the outflow has been driven by private sector capital flows, not by a current account deficit, but it still needs to be financed. So how does this outflow of private money actually get financed? It gets financed by an equal and opposite flow between the central banks. As a result, the Bank of Spain builds up a debit and the Bundesbank builds up a credit.
In the case of two completely independent countries, these debits and credits would get settled by a payments flow of between the relevant central banks. Under the Gold Standard, this flow would be in gold itself. Under the Bretton Woods system, it would be in dollars. In either case, the outflow of official reserves would force Spain to take steps to eliminate its balance of payments deficit by tightening monetary policy or allowing the exchange rate to depreciate, so the problem would, in principle, be self correcting.
The key difference between these situations and the euro mechanism is that the the debits of the Bank of Spain never get settled at all; they just get larger and larger, for as long as the Spanish balance of payments imbalance persists. And the same applies to the “credits” of the Bundesbank. This is why the Target 2 imbalances inside the ECB balance sheet have grown so large in recent years. As long as the national central banks are willing to allow these imbalances passively to rise, then the single currency simply cannot break up. That is what makes it a single currency.
However, as Mr Draghi has now implicitly acknowledged, the markets are no longer convinced that the Target 2 imbalances will be allowed to rise without limit. Although the Bundesbank has pointed out many times that Germany’s credits under this system are against the ECB, and not against any individual country, potential Target 2 losses after a euro break up have become a political issue within Germany, undermining market confidence in the ultimate stability of the euro.
It is risky for a central banker to acknowledge that the payments system on which the currency stands may not be fully credible. Mr Draghi could simply have repeated the old line that the operation of the Target 2 system is enough to ensure that the euro can never fall apart. By admitting the reality that the system is no longer 100 per cent credible in the eyes of the market, the ECB president has invited investors to ask whether his proposed interventions are powerful enough to deal with problem he has raised.
This question requires a more complete analysis at a later date. However, it is worth noting that Mr Draghi’s latest idea – ECB purchases of short dated bonds under a reactivated Securities’ Market Programme – will not increase the scale of official capital inflows into Spain, since they will (mostly) be undetaken by a Spanish entity, the Bank of Spain*. This means that reactivation of the SMP will not eliminate the need for Target 2 imbalances to continue rising, which ultimately could undermine confidence in the single currency still further. In order to prevent that, more drastic action to raise official capital flows into Spain, like providing a banking licence for the ESM, would be required.
——————————————————————————————————
* The exact impact of the SMP on capital flows, and therefore on the need for further increases in Target 2 imbalances, is not a straightforward or transparent matter. After consulting several macro-economists on this (Martin Brookes and Juan Antolin-Diaz at Fulcrum, Huw Pill at Goldman Sachs and David Mackie at J.P.Morgan), I have concluded that most SMP purchases have been made by national central banks from entities within their own countries, so that no cross border flows have been involved. I assume this pattern continues under SMP2.
Gavyn Davies
Welcome [email protected] Your account Site tour Sign out
Draghi breaks the ultimate euro taboo
August 5, 2012 4:14 pm by Gavyn Davies
7
inShare4
7When Mario Draghi said on 26 July that a “convertibility risk” was preventing the smooth functioning of the ECB’s monetary policy across national borders inside the eurozone, he was breaking a taboo which has been stubbornly followed by all of his predecessors in the project to create a durable single currency. (See Alphaville here.) That taboo is that no-one in the ECB should ever admit that the euro might break apart. The objective of the taboo (which admittedly has previously been broken in the “special case” of Greece) has always been to ensure that markets should not feel the need to reflect any concerns about possible foreign exchange risk among the member states which comprise the euro.
By admitting that this “convertibility risk” now exists, the ECB president has implicitly acknowledged that the permanence of the single currency is not fully credible in the financial markets. The recognition of redenomination risk after a potential devaluation is one reason, he implies, why sovereign bond yields are now so high in Spain and Italy. He has said that this prevents the ECB from transmitting its intended monetary stance into those economies, which gives the ECB the right to take direct action to reduce these bond yields.
After last Thursday’s ECB meeting, it appears that this direct action will be to purchase short dated government bonds in Spain and Italy, provided that these governments have previously applied for support from the EFSF/ESM mechanism, and have accepted any conditions attached. The question is whether this action will be enough to put the convertibility genie back into the bottle.
Until Mr Draghi’s recent remarks, the ECB’s line on convertibility risk was that the different members of the eurozone should be treated like the different districts of the Federal Reserve system in the US. In other words, they should be seen as the component parts of a single payments union, where the value of the euro is guaranteed to be the same throughout the eurozone. The bedrock of this guarantee is our old friend the ECB’s Target 2 payments system, which ensures that payments made in euros by solvent and liquid entities will always clear, wherever they are made within the eurozone. By this means, the ECB ensures that the market does not need to worry that a Greek or Spanish euro will ever be worth less than a German euro.
What lies behind this guarantee is, however, an obscure mechanism which in effect means that the national central banks of the strong economies (eg the Bundesbank) are offering to extend a potentially unlimited amount of credit to the central banks of the weaker economies (eg the Bank of Spain) in order to ensure that the monetary union stays intact.
They in fact do this via the ECB balance sheet, which stands between the Bundesbank and the Bank of Spain. But this does not alter the basic fact that the original design of the euro did not take into account the strains which would be placed on this mechanism if a country like Spain were to run a large and persistent balance of payments deficit (on current and private capital account) against Germany, which is what has been happening.A balance of payments deficit means that Spanish residents are making larger outgoing payments to (say) Germany than German residents are making to them. Since 2008, the outflow has been driven by private sector capital flows, not by a current account deficit, but it still needs to be financed. So how does this outflow of private money actually get financed? It gets financed by an equal and opposite flow between the central banks. As a result, the Bank of Spain builds up a debit and the Bundesbank builds up a credit.
In the case of two completely independent countries, these debits and credits would get settled by a payments flow of between the relevant central banks. Under the Gold Standard, this flow would be in gold itself. Under the Bretton Woods system, it would be in dollars. In either case, the outflow of official reserves would force Spain to take steps to eliminate its balance of payments deficit by tightening monetary policy or allowing the exchange rate to depreciate, so the problem would, in principle, be self correcting.
The key difference between these situations and the euro mechanism is that the the debits of the Bank of Spain never get settled at all; they just get larger and larger, for as long as the Spanish balance of payments imbalance persists. And the same applies to the “credits” of the Bundesbank. This is why the Target 2 imbalances inside the ECB balance sheet have grown so large in recent years. As long as the national central banks are willing to allow these imbalances passively to rise, then the single currency simply cannot break up. That is what makes it a single currency.
However, as Mr Draghi has now implicitly acknowledged, the markets are no longer convinced that the Target 2 imbalances will be allowed to rise without limit. Although the Bundesbank has pointed out many times that Germany’s credits under this system are against the ECB, and not against any individual country, potential Target 2 losses after a euro break up have become a political issue within Germany, undermining market confidence in the ultimate stability of the euro.
It is risky for a central banker to acknowledge that the payments system on which the currency stands may not be fully credible. Mr Draghi could simply have repeated the old line that the operation of the Target 2 system is enough to ensure that the euro can never fall apart. By admitting the reality that the system is no longer 100 per cent credible in the eyes of the market, the ECB president has invited investors to ask whether his proposed interventions are powerful enough to deal with problem he has raised.
This question requires a more complete analysis at a later date. However, it is worth noting that Mr Draghi’s latest idea – ECB purchases of short dated bonds under a reactivated Securities’ Market Programme – will not increase the scale of official capital inflows into Spain, since they will (mostly) be undetaken by a Spanish entity, the Bank of Spain*. This means that reactivation of the SMP will not eliminate the need for Target 2 imbalances to continue rising, which ultimately could undermine confidence in the single currency still further. In order to prevent that, more drastic action to raise official capital flows into Spain, like providing a banking licence for the ESM, would be required.
——————————————————————————————————
* The exact impact of the SMP on capital flows, and therefore on the need for further increases in Target 2 imbalances, is not a straightforward or transparent matter. After consulting several macro-economists on this (Martin Brookes and Juan Antolin-Diaz at Fulcrum, Huw Pill at Goldman Sachs and David Mackie at J.P.Morgan), I have concluded that most SMP purchases have been made by national central banks from entities within their own countries, so that no cross border flows have been involved. I assume this pattern continues under SMP2.
storm
Forumer storico
Mi pare molto chiaro cosa pensino i big investors...
Bill Gross:
Draghi and friends just want your money
By Bill Gross
Psst! Investors – do you wanna know a secret? Do you wanna know what Angela Merkel, François Hollande, Christine Lagarde and Mario Draghi all share in common? They want your money!
They’ve wanted it for years now but you are resisting by holding on to it or investing it at negative interest rates in Switzerland, Germany and a growing number of other countries considered to be European Union havens. They want you to be less frugal and more risk-seeking. They want your money as a substitute for theirs in Spain, Italy and, of course, Greece, but they don’t mention that any more. The example would be too off-putting. “Investors,” they plead, “show us your money!”
More
On this story
The ultimate goal of monetary and fiscal policy in the EU is to re-engage the private sector. The EU needs the private sector as a willing (but not necessarily equal) partner in funding its economy. This often gets lost in the noisy details of all too frequent promises such as the one to defend the euro made by Mr Draghi, European Central Bank president.
Investors get distracted by the hundreds of billions of euros in sovereign policy checks, promises and IOUs that make for media headlines but forget it’s their trillions that are the real objective. Even Mr Hollande in left-leaning France recognises that the private sector is critical for future growth in the EU. He knows that, without its partnership, a one-sided funding via state-controlled banks and central banks will inevitably lead to high debt-to-GDP ratios, rating service downgrades and a downhill vicious cycle of recession.
But private investors are balking – and for what it seems are good reasons – because policy makers’ efforts have been, until now, a day late and a euro short, or more accurately, years late and a trillion euros short. Let’s look at some examples of this.
First, Greek bailouts that included private sector involvement but no official sector involvement, resulting in the inevitable investor conclusion that future programmes for Spain and Italy might resemble the same.
Second, an initial tightening and then a reluctant lowering of ECB policy rates.
Third, a bond purchase programme (securities markets programme or SMP) by the ECB that was too small and prematurely abandoned.
Fourth, fiscal austerity packages for individual countries that accelerated recessionary/depressionary growth paths.
Fifth, public fights among northern and southern EU countries that highlighted the seemingly perpetual dysfunctionality of the eurozone 17 and the EU 27.
Finally, Mr Draghi’s reversal last Thursday. Someone must have got to him between London and Frankfurt.
Policy makers now face an unprecedented expansion of risk spreads and credit agency downgrades which almost guarantee that sickbed countries can never be discharged from intensive care.
In depth
Eurozone in crisis
As the debt storm spreads Europe’s leaders battle to save the eurozone
Investors misguidedly focus on 7 per cent yields in Spanish and Italian bond markets as some sort of high watermark – below which swimmers can safely touch bottom. But even at 7 per cent deep, the toes cannot stretch. Maybe even 4 per cent is not shallow enough.
Interest rates over and above each country’s nominal GDP growth rate will inevitably add to a country’s debt as a percentage of GDP, even if budgets are in primary balance.
At current yields, growth rates, and deficits, the spread may incrementally add 2-3 per cent to Spain and Italy’s tenuous debt ratios every year. While it is true that both countries can shorten maturity offerings and even accept the benefit of prior terming of their debt stock, eventual drowning will occur even at 4 per cent or higher 10-year yields as long as nominal GDP growth is anywhere close to flat.
Policy makers will solicit the private market’s participation in an effort to get there, by attempting to lead via co-ordinated monetary/fiscal efforts involving the SMP from the ECB and hundreds of billions of euros from bailout funds – the European Financial Stability Facility and ultimately the European Stability Mechanism. But without the private sector’s co-operation, the effort may be futile.
The dirty little secret that sovereign debt issuing nations need to remember most of all is that credit and maturity extension is based upon trust. After all, “credere” is a Latin word meaning just that. After trust has been lost due to half-baked policy measures; after credit agencies belatedly have recognised embedded costs of debt that can no longer insure solvency; after marginal investors have been flushed from the system to what appear to be safer return of principal havens; and after policy makers finally appreciate the fragility of their rigged fiscal and monetary system; after all of that – there is no coming home, there is no going back in the water.
Psst investors: Stay dry my friends!
Bill Gross is founder and co-chief investment officer of Pimco
Bill Gross:
Draghi and friends just want your money
By Bill Gross
Psst! Investors – do you wanna know a secret? Do you wanna know what Angela Merkel, François Hollande, Christine Lagarde and Mario Draghi all share in common? They want your money!
They’ve wanted it for years now but you are resisting by holding on to it or investing it at negative interest rates in Switzerland, Germany and a growing number of other countries considered to be European Union havens. They want you to be less frugal and more risk-seeking. They want your money as a substitute for theirs in Spain, Italy and, of course, Greece, but they don’t mention that any more. The example would be too off-putting. “Investors,” they plead, “show us your money!”
More
On this story
- In depth Eurozone in crisis
- Gavyn Davies Draghi breaks euro taboo
- Market boost from Spain bailout hint
- Madrid and Rome’s borrowing costs dive
- Volatile swings push central bankers
- US banks haunted by spectre of eurozone
- Italy ‘mad’ to seek bailout before Spain
- Global Market Overview Stocks rally as US jobs data beat forecast
- Euro falls on lack of ECB action
- Brace for an era of crisis aftershocks
- Time for something different from the ECB
- Time for west to adjust to ‘new normal’
- Ebbing fortunes for Indian banks
The ultimate goal of monetary and fiscal policy in the EU is to re-engage the private sector. The EU needs the private sector as a willing (but not necessarily equal) partner in funding its economy. This often gets lost in the noisy details of all too frequent promises such as the one to defend the euro made by Mr Draghi, European Central Bank president.
Investors get distracted by the hundreds of billions of euros in sovereign policy checks, promises and IOUs that make for media headlines but forget it’s their trillions that are the real objective. Even Mr Hollande in left-leaning France recognises that the private sector is critical for future growth in the EU. He knows that, without its partnership, a one-sided funding via state-controlled banks and central banks will inevitably lead to high debt-to-GDP ratios, rating service downgrades and a downhill vicious cycle of recession.
But private investors are balking – and for what it seems are good reasons – because policy makers’ efforts have been, until now, a day late and a euro short, or more accurately, years late and a trillion euros short. Let’s look at some examples of this.
First, Greek bailouts that included private sector involvement but no official sector involvement, resulting in the inevitable investor conclusion that future programmes for Spain and Italy might resemble the same.
Second, an initial tightening and then a reluctant lowering of ECB policy rates.
Third, a bond purchase programme (securities markets programme or SMP) by the ECB that was too small and prematurely abandoned.
Fourth, fiscal austerity packages for individual countries that accelerated recessionary/depressionary growth paths.
Fifth, public fights among northern and southern EU countries that highlighted the seemingly perpetual dysfunctionality of the eurozone 17 and the EU 27.
Finally, Mr Draghi’s reversal last Thursday. Someone must have got to him between London and Frankfurt.
Policy makers now face an unprecedented expansion of risk spreads and credit agency downgrades which almost guarantee that sickbed countries can never be discharged from intensive care.
In depth
Eurozone in crisis
As the debt storm spreads Europe’s leaders battle to save the eurozone
Investors misguidedly focus on 7 per cent yields in Spanish and Italian bond markets as some sort of high watermark – below which swimmers can safely touch bottom. But even at 7 per cent deep, the toes cannot stretch. Maybe even 4 per cent is not shallow enough.
Interest rates over and above each country’s nominal GDP growth rate will inevitably add to a country’s debt as a percentage of GDP, even if budgets are in primary balance.
At current yields, growth rates, and deficits, the spread may incrementally add 2-3 per cent to Spain and Italy’s tenuous debt ratios every year. While it is true that both countries can shorten maturity offerings and even accept the benefit of prior terming of their debt stock, eventual drowning will occur even at 4 per cent or higher 10-year yields as long as nominal GDP growth is anywhere close to flat.
Policy makers will solicit the private market’s participation in an effort to get there, by attempting to lead via co-ordinated monetary/fiscal efforts involving the SMP from the ECB and hundreds of billions of euros from bailout funds – the European Financial Stability Facility and ultimately the European Stability Mechanism. But without the private sector’s co-operation, the effort may be futile.
The dirty little secret that sovereign debt issuing nations need to remember most of all is that credit and maturity extension is based upon trust. After all, “credere” is a Latin word meaning just that. After trust has been lost due to half-baked policy measures; after credit agencies belatedly have recognised embedded costs of debt that can no longer insure solvency; after marginal investors have been flushed from the system to what appear to be safer return of principal havens; and after policy makers finally appreciate the fragility of their rigged fiscal and monetary system; after all of that – there is no coming home, there is no going back in the water.
Psst investors: Stay dry my friends!
Bill Gross is founder and co-chief investment officer of Pimco
salcatal
Come i Panda
Buongiorno.
Sarà che stiamo ad agosto ed i volumi sono così sottili, ma onestamente questi rialzi, specie dei titoli bancari italiani, per me sono inspiegabili.
Hanno presentato bilanci in perdita, puntellati come sono da proventi straordinari.
Le sofferenze, purtroppo, sono in ascesa inarrestabile e aumenteranno ancora per effetto della recessione.
Purtroppo non ho ancora fatto l'integrazione contrattuale per andare short. Meglio così, se ne parla a settembre.
Ma sono short massicciamente un pò su tutto, con singoli titoli.
I mercati potranno continuare a salire ancora, su questo non vi è dubbio.
Ma non penso tanto e non penso per molto, almeno spero per le mie finanze.
Sarà che stiamo ad agosto ed i volumi sono così sottili, ma onestamente questi rialzi, specie dei titoli bancari italiani, per me sono inspiegabili.
Hanno presentato bilanci in perdita, puntellati come sono da proventi straordinari.
Le sofferenze, purtroppo, sono in ascesa inarrestabile e aumenteranno ancora per effetto della recessione.
Purtroppo non ho ancora fatto l'integrazione contrattuale per andare short. Meglio così, se ne parla a settembre.
Ma sono short massicciamente un pò su tutto, con singoli titoli.
I mercati potranno continuare a salire ancora, su questo non vi è dubbio.
Ma non penso tanto e non penso per molto, almeno spero per le mie finanze.
Ultima modifica:
salcatal
Come i Panda
Buonasera.
I mercati, come spesso capita, hanno deciso di prendere decisamente la strada del rialzo, a dispetto della situazione macroeconomica e di quella delle singole società.
Infatti, a ben vedere, non scorgo titoli particolarmente sottovalutati rispetto ai fondamentali attuali e prospettici.
A questo punto si puo' pensare o che le mani forti conoscano notizie di dettaglio sugli interventi prossimi delle banche centrali, non note pubblicamente, tali da giustificare questo mini rally, oppure che questo rialzo e' farlocco e, in quanto tale, destinato a spegnersi come neve al sole.
Io, dal mio canto, sono short su MT, Siemens, K+S, SG e FT.
Oggi ho chiuso, in apertura lo short aperto ieri su SG e Siemens, nonché uno intraday su Vivendi.
La mia posizione e' nettamente sbilanciata verso lo short su dax e CAC, parzialmente compensata dai TDS italiani in portafoglio, che penso di vendere domani.
I mercati, come spesso capita, hanno deciso di prendere decisamente la strada del rialzo, a dispetto della situazione macroeconomica e di quella delle singole società.
Infatti, a ben vedere, non scorgo titoli particolarmente sottovalutati rispetto ai fondamentali attuali e prospettici.
A questo punto si puo' pensare o che le mani forti conoscano notizie di dettaglio sugli interventi prossimi delle banche centrali, non note pubblicamente, tali da giustificare questo mini rally, oppure che questo rialzo e' farlocco e, in quanto tale, destinato a spegnersi come neve al sole.
Io, dal mio canto, sono short su MT, Siemens, K+S, SG e FT.
Oggi ho chiuso, in apertura lo short aperto ieri su SG e Siemens, nonché uno intraday su Vivendi.
La mia posizione e' nettamente sbilanciata verso lo short su dax e CAC, parzialmente compensata dai TDS italiani in portafoglio, che penso di vendere domani.
storm
Forumer storico
Io la mia view l'ho già espressa per me alla fine stamperanno, ma non prima di aver commissariato Spagna e Italia e per fare questo devono per forza ritirare giù tutto perchè fino a che i rendimenti sono bassi questi due paesi non chiederanno aiuti.
Non penso che i tedeschi diano via libera a interventi non convenzionali o ad altro prima del commissariamento.
Intanto il famoso bicchiere mezzo vuoto comincia a stimolare i dubbi degli investitori....
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-...-spain-italy-maturity-crunch-euro-credit.html
Non penso che i tedeschi diano via libera a interventi non convenzionali o ad altro prima del commissariamento.
Intanto il famoso bicchiere mezzo vuoto comincia a stimolare i dubbi degli investitori....
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-...-spain-italy-maturity-crunch-euro-credit.html
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