Gloria ai Bastardi - Cap. 1 (3 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Dogtown
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
Dogtown
Forever Ultras Ghetto
Non...qui si cerca di fare chiarezza, per quanto possibile, e se ci riesce di "aiutarsi" a vicenda...poi ognuno con la sua testa e i suoi soldi.
Le cazzate le fanno tutti, io per primo, chi trada può sbagliare, chi parla di trading e basta e non fa nulla...bèh è un altro discorso e a me non interessa
Dogtown
Forever Ultras Ghetto
The Deeper Causes of the Global Stocks Rout
To shed light on one of the worst starts to a new year for global stock markets, some analysts are turning to macroeconomic explanations, such as China’s economic slowdown and its uncharacteristic policy slips. Others prefer to focus on the cascading influence of unhinged markets, such as oil. Yet neither explanation is sufficiently comprehensive; and each fails to account for major changes in liquidity and volatility.
The unfavorable market impact of China’s sputtering growth engine has been amplified by some unusual policy moves, including the sudden reversal in the implementation of circuit breakers for the stock market, a partial loss of policy influence over the growing offshore market for the currency and poor communication. These alone, however, don’t justify the extent of the stock selloff around the world, including in the U.S., where the 8 percent drop in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index in the last two weeks was inconsistent with an economy that continues to heal.
A similar dynamic is at work in the oil market. Yes, oil prices have been undermined by the mismatch between growing supply, including from shale, and slowing demand growth. This undoubtedly has been aggravated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ decision to abandon the role of swing producer on the downside (that is, cutting production to limit price declines). But the resulting moves in oil, and the extent to which these have contributed to the more general financial instability, have been overstated, particularly when it comes to the effects on sectors and countries that are big consumers of energy and that are benefiting from enormous windfalls.
Why then do even small changes in these variables lead to outsize moves in financial asset prices, both up and down? And why do global stock markets have a general downward bias?
Financial markets are undergoing two consequential transitions, which not only amplify the impact of even the smallest developments in China and oil, but also increase risk aversion overall and create the conditions for more unpredictable developments.
The first has to do with the shift from a prolonged regime of repressed financial volatility to an environment in which such instability is higher and less predictable. The primary reason is that central banks are less willing (in the case of the Federal Reserve) or less able (in the case of the European Central Bank and the People’s Bank of China) to act as suppressors of volatility. In the short term, this transition inevitably leads to higher risk aversion, deleveraging and lower portfolio risk-taking, especially affecting risk-based models and asset allocations that use volatility as a major input.
The second transition involves liquidity, and a move away from counter-cyclical balance sheets. Facing tighter regulation and sharply reduced market appetite for short-term earnings deviations, broker-dealers are a lot less willing to take on inventory when the market overshoots. Other pools of capital, including sovereign wealth funds, also face constraints in increasing their risk-taking.
Left unchecked, these two transitions would feed each other, accentuating the general sense of financial instability and insecurity. The longer this continues, the greater the volatility and the bigger the threat of adverse consequences for economic and corporate fundamentals; and the higher the risk that the instability could then spill back onto financial markets, fueling a destabilizing vicious cycle of economic and financial dislocations.
The good news is that such dynamics ultimately exhaust themselves. Unfortunately, that only happens after a lot of volatility, accompanied by a heightened risk of very sharp and disorderly declines in financial asset prices as well as contagion. In the process, that turmoil has a contractionary influence on corporate and household spending, slowing economic growth.
A much better resolution would be if improving fundamentals could support and validate financial asset prices, which also would provide the context for the productive engagement of the large amounts of cash now held on the sidelines, whether on companies’ balance sheets or in excess household savings. Policy adjustments will be needed for this to occur, and, this time, the response cannot be the sole responsibility of central banks in general (and the Federal Reserve, in particular).
Indeed, even if the Fed were to resort to a new program of large-scale securities’ purchases ("QE4"), the measures’ economic effectiveness would be in great doubt from the outset unless they were accompanied by pro-growth structural reforms, more responsive fiscal policy and the removal of entrenched debt overhangs.
Neither of these outcomes is preordained. What happens next depends on choices that will be made in the weeks and months ahead, particularly by politicians who, through inaction and partisan bickering, have placed too much of the policy burden on central banks for far too long.
Mohamed El Erian
To shed light on one of the worst starts to a new year for global stock markets, some analysts are turning to macroeconomic explanations, such as China’s economic slowdown and its uncharacteristic policy slips. Others prefer to focus on the cascading influence of unhinged markets, such as oil. Yet neither explanation is sufficiently comprehensive; and each fails to account for major changes in liquidity and volatility.
The unfavorable market impact of China’s sputtering growth engine has been amplified by some unusual policy moves, including the sudden reversal in the implementation of circuit breakers for the stock market, a partial loss of policy influence over the growing offshore market for the currency and poor communication. These alone, however, don’t justify the extent of the stock selloff around the world, including in the U.S., where the 8 percent drop in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index in the last two weeks was inconsistent with an economy that continues to heal.
A similar dynamic is at work in the oil market. Yes, oil prices have been undermined by the mismatch between growing supply, including from shale, and slowing demand growth. This undoubtedly has been aggravated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ decision to abandon the role of swing producer on the downside (that is, cutting production to limit price declines). But the resulting moves in oil, and the extent to which these have contributed to the more general financial instability, have been overstated, particularly when it comes to the effects on sectors and countries that are big consumers of energy and that are benefiting from enormous windfalls.
Why then do even small changes in these variables lead to outsize moves in financial asset prices, both up and down? And why do global stock markets have a general downward bias?
Financial markets are undergoing two consequential transitions, which not only amplify the impact of even the smallest developments in China and oil, but also increase risk aversion overall and create the conditions for more unpredictable developments.
The first has to do with the shift from a prolonged regime of repressed financial volatility to an environment in which such instability is higher and less predictable. The primary reason is that central banks are less willing (in the case of the Federal Reserve) or less able (in the case of the European Central Bank and the People’s Bank of China) to act as suppressors of volatility. In the short term, this transition inevitably leads to higher risk aversion, deleveraging and lower portfolio risk-taking, especially affecting risk-based models and asset allocations that use volatility as a major input.
The second transition involves liquidity, and a move away from counter-cyclical balance sheets. Facing tighter regulation and sharply reduced market appetite for short-term earnings deviations, broker-dealers are a lot less willing to take on inventory when the market overshoots. Other pools of capital, including sovereign wealth funds, also face constraints in increasing their risk-taking.
Left unchecked, these two transitions would feed each other, accentuating the general sense of financial instability and insecurity. The longer this continues, the greater the volatility and the bigger the threat of adverse consequences for economic and corporate fundamentals; and the higher the risk that the instability could then spill back onto financial markets, fueling a destabilizing vicious cycle of economic and financial dislocations.
The good news is that such dynamics ultimately exhaust themselves. Unfortunately, that only happens after a lot of volatility, accompanied by a heightened risk of very sharp and disorderly declines in financial asset prices as well as contagion. In the process, that turmoil has a contractionary influence on corporate and household spending, slowing economic growth.
A much better resolution would be if improving fundamentals could support and validate financial asset prices, which also would provide the context for the productive engagement of the large amounts of cash now held on the sidelines, whether on companies’ balance sheets or in excess household savings. Policy adjustments will be needed for this to occur, and, this time, the response cannot be the sole responsibility of central banks in general (and the Federal Reserve, in particular).
Indeed, even if the Fed were to resort to a new program of large-scale securities’ purchases ("QE4"), the measures’ economic effectiveness would be in great doubt from the outset unless they were accompanied by pro-growth structural reforms, more responsive fiscal policy and the removal of entrenched debt overhangs.
Neither of these outcomes is preordained. What happens next depends on choices that will be made in the weeks and months ahead, particularly by politicians who, through inaction and partisan bickering, have placed too much of the policy burden on central banks for far too long.
Mohamed El Erian
Ultima modifica:
lupoalberto66
Forumer storico
...DB è una bomba atomica, potenzialmente pari a Lehman, con la differenza che oggi il contesto dei mercati è ancora deteriorato e frammentato...e i tassi sono a zero.
DB= Das Problem
mavvà
per quel pochinino-poco di esposizione che avrà con qualche emergente
il solito estremista
buonasera a tutti
Nonsoniente
Forumer storico
Scusa DOG ma mi permetterai che se uno come me, da anni va pensando e dicendo che questo sistema, Globalizzazione, Liberoscambismo, mercati deregolamentati, Unione monetaria europea, non può reggere e al primo scossone, zio porko invece di aver guadagnato una valanga di soldi a ribasso, sono anche incartato ( non molto per fortuna) a rialzo. Devo ritenermi bravo? Un Mona grande come il Monte Suman mi sento, kazzo ero qui che l'aspettavo questa crisi bancaria, Zio lazzarone, ma non ho guadagnato un kazzo.
lupoalberto66
Forumer storico
Per cercare di risollevare il morale ai correntisti, gli spin doktors del Bomba (gente di primissima, tipo guelfoguelfi, per intenderci, mica paglia, eh)
hanno deciso di lanciare la kampagna per il nuovo logo MPS
Mi propongo con questo: "Banca dal 1472 al 2016"
)hanno deciso di lanciare la kampagna per il nuovo logo MPS
Mi propongo con questo: "Banca dal 1472 al 2016"
DDUKE
Viva i popoli, Viva le Nazioni europee, fanculo U€
non hai capito, il tuo è un ragionamento sbagliato. Ho fatto l'esempio aprile 2015 agosto 2015 quando chi era short incastrato faceva i tuoi stessi ragionamenti e anche chi ancora doveva completare l'esposizione al ribasso.
Sembra non arrivare mai il momento ma poi arriva con gli interessi. Sembrano essere tutti ganzi i longhisti incalliti e shortisti incalliti...ma poi arriva il momento.
Adesso è la stessa situazione. L'unica cosa che si può fare è restare fermi, non incrementare e gessare nel caso non fosse finita qua. Torno a ripetere, agosto 2011 e settembre. Chi ha lavorato, come me, ci ha messo due mesi per rimettere le cose a posto e andare in guadagno e al rialzo si può fare, caso mai sono i mercati rialzisti i peggiori, quelli ti distruggono lentamente.
DANY1969
Forumer storico
...DB è una bomba atomica, potenzialmente pari a Lehman, con la differenza che oggi il contesto dei mercati è ancora deteriorato e frammentato...e i tassi sono a zero.
DB= Das Problem
Che delusione ragazzi
... non potevate farmi questo ... Ho sempre creduto che DB fosse Dany Bona
... ci voleva anche questa... che periodo infame Per cercare di risollevare il morale ai correntisti, gli spin doktors del Bomba (gente di primissima, tipo guelfoguelfi, per intenderci, mica paglia, eh
hanno deciso di lanciare la kampagna per il nuovo logo MPS
Mi propongo con questo: "Banca dal 1472 al 2016"
Sarà un successo
Buongiorno a tutti
Ultima modifica:
nemo79
Forumer storico
La chiusura di settimana sarà molto importante. Mi sono imposto di aspettare domani sera prima di toccare il portafoglio.
E' da sottolineare che un sentiment così ribassista a ricordi miei per essere rotto e per instaurare un rialzo che superi la settimana ha bisogno di una ripartenza a V decisa della serie 1500-2000 punti in tre giorni
Oppure di una fase di consolidamento laterale ma non più lunga di qualche giorno senza fare nuovi minimi e ripartenza.
Tutto il resto è continuazione short
E' da sottolineare che un sentiment così ribassista a ricordi miei per essere rotto e per instaurare un rialzo che superi la settimana ha bisogno di una ripartenza a V decisa della serie 1500-2000 punti in tre giorni
Oppure di una fase di consolidamento laterale ma non più lunga di qualche giorno senza fare nuovi minimi e ripartenza.
Tutto il resto è continuazione short
Dogtown
Forever Ultras Ghetto
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