Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi | Pagina 239

Discussione in 'Obbligazioni, Bond e Titoli di Stato' iniziata da METHOS, 9 Gennaio 2009.

    15 Febbraio 2010
  1. Geller

    Geller Banned

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    In Eurolandia si sono aperte le porte della valuta euro a troppi Paesi ... per ragioni strettamente diplomatiche e politiche ... Ed ora emergono con forza le debolezze strutturali interne di alcuni Stati (come la Grecia, il Portogallo, e purtroppo anche l'Italia) che indeboliscono la moneta unica ! :rolleyes:

    Se ne avvantaggerà sempre più il dollaro :up:
    Questa è l'unica consolazione per l'investitore lungimirante che ha saputo differenziare gli investimenti su un paniere di valute. ;)

    Ad ogni modo l'Europa supererà l'attuale crisi. E le più cupe previsioni, create ad arte dalla speculazione, non dureranno se non il tempo di speculare appunto.
    Occhiali scuri ed occhiali rosa sono nella dotazione standard degli investitori professionali ... Loro se li mettono e se li tolgono con disinvoltura e cinismo per lucrare sul sentiment che va di moda in un dato momento, mentre alcuni rimangono ipnotizzati nel bene o nel male, prendono tutto sul serio e ... non si accorgono dei consueti giochi che regolano i mercati finanziari ... :rolleyes:
     
  2. 15 Febbraio 2010
  3. stockuccio

    stockuccio Guest

  4. 15 Febbraio 2010
  5. stockuccio

    stockuccio Guest

    divergenze d'opinioni :D

    'They Just Don't See It'

    OK, time for a pop quiz.
    When it comes to figuring out where things are headed, would you rather listen to these guys:
    "U.S. Economy to Strengthen, Reducing Unemployment, Survey Says" (Bloomberg)
    U.S. unemployment peaked in October and will retreat through 2011 as the economy strengthens, according to economists surveyed by Bloomberg News.
    The world’s largest economy will grow 3 percent this year and next, more than anticipated a month ago, according to the median estimate of 62 economists polled this month. The jobless rate, which reached a 26-year high of 10.1 percent in October, will end the year at 9.5 percent.
    Efforts to rebuild inventories, investments in new equipment and software and improving sales overseas will spur employment and household spending. Scant inflation will give Federal Reserve policy makers room to keep the target interest rate near zero through the third quarter, buying the economy enough time to reach a self-sustaining expansion.
    “It’s a matter of time before strength in the economy effectively feeds on itself, with more employment leading to stronger spending, which in turn leads to more employment,” said James O’Sullivan, global chief economist at MF Global Ltd. in New York. “The key is going to be the business sector leading the way and consumer spending following.”
    "U.S. to Grow 3 Percent This Year From Year Ago, Fed Survey Shows" (Bloomberg BusinessWeek)
    The U.S. economy will grow 3 percent this year from a year earlier, faster than previously predicted, according to a survey of economists released today by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    The 42 respondents also expected a “slightly stronger labor market” this year than they did in the fourth quarter, the Philadelphia Fed said in a statement. The outlook for gross domestic product was more optimistic than the forecast in the fourth quarter of last year for 2.4 percent growth in 2010, it said. The U.S. unemployment rate will average 9.8 percent this year, the survey showed.
    Or these guys [italics mine]:
    "Corporate America Is More Pessimistic Than You Know" (Deal Journal)
    Looking for an explanation for the deep freeze in merger & acquisition activity and the jittery stock market? Just ask the boards overseeing U.S. companies.
    A whopping 66% of 1,200 corporate board members surveyed recently said U.S. companies wouldn’t return to “business as usual” until at least 2013, and will operate till then in an environment of sluggish sales and growth. Roughly 45% said the economy wouldn’t return to precrisis levels in terms of investment, employment and productivity before 2013, according to the survey, conducted by KPMG LLP, while 22% said it would come beyond 2014.
    “Not withstanding what economists are saying about the recovery, we are hearing from board members that they just don’t see it,’’ says Mary Pat McCarthy, a KPMG vice chairwoman who oversaw the survey of directors at publicly traded companies of varying sizes across the U.S.
    McCarthy spoke to Deal Journal this morning from Miami where KPMG was hosting a conference of primarily audit committee members of corporate boards. “We are hearing a steady drumbeat down here that a recovery is a way’s off,” she said.
    Another concern among board members: That the cost-cutting and layoffs that have helped boost corporate profits are going to hurt companies in the long term. The survey found that 67% of the respondents said were most concerned that cost-cutting would drain a company’s employee talent.
    Other concerns: 36% said they worried cost-cutting would weaken internal controls, 25% said it could raise the risk of fraud and 22% said they thought the integrity of financial reporting could suffer in the hands of leaner staffs.
    Yeah, I thought so.
     
  6. 15 Febbraio 2010
  7. The Beast

    The Beast Rating? No grazie!

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  8. 15 Febbraio 2010
  9. palenque

    palenque New Member

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    Si ma forte il calcio.

    Il problema è che la grande occasione di nazionalizzare queste banche e rifondarle con delle regole diverse è stata persa il marzo scorso quando erano alla canna del gas.:(
     
  10. 16 Febbraio 2010
  11. stockuccio

    stockuccio Guest

    un altro pezzo di Zibordi



    Allora: Markit.com è un sito di cui sono azioniste le "solite" banche, che registra quello che dette banche riportano sui prezzi e transazioni dei famigerati "Credit Default Swap", che loro e solo loro trattano, in modo opaco e non regolamentato, tipo delle scritture private. Vedi qui ad esempio fresca fresca la storia del nostro Paolo Pellegrini e John Paulson and the Greatest Pump and Short Fraud Ever sui CDO dei mutui suprime che da un idea di come funziona. Piccolo riassunto.

    Paolo Pellegrini e John Paulson sono andati dalle Goldman, Deutsche, Morgan e hanno detto: "...vogliamo che ci create un derivato sull'indice dei mutui e ci mettiamo dentro però alcune centinaia di mutui che vi diciamo noi, prendiamo i più assurdi e marci, quelli fatti a immigrati e neri che non restituiranno mai, ma li misceliamo con altri in modo che il rating rimanga buono

    ...Poi voi a Morgan e Goldman e Deutsche andate da AIG e create assieme a loro che sono un assicurazione, un "assicurazione sui mutui" un Credit Default Swap su questo "Indice dei Mutui Marci e Senza Speranza fatti a Messicani, Hiatiani e Negri" (ma con un nome magari più rassicurante, tipo "High Yield Asset Backed Securities...")

    ....Avrai tante istituzioni che lo comprano, paga un 7%, ha un rating ancora discreto e ci compri un assicurazione sopra per sicurezza per voi lo emettete forse a 100, lo vendete ai vostri clienti a 100 e noi lo vendiamo simultaneamente subito short per 20 miliardi a 100.

    ....Sappiamo che crollerà a 50 centesimi, se va bene, noi quindi andiamo short un derivato che abbiamo costruito apposta assieme a voi sapendo che dentro è marcio e perderà il 50% facciamo miliardi, voi ci guadagnate un 2% sul controvalore della transazione che sono decine miliardi di controvalore e verso i vostri clienti direte che era difficile prevedere che il valore delle case possa scendere ecc..., AIG guadagna anche lei una commissione, ...e le istituzioni che se lo comprano fidandosi che è Citi, Morgan e Goldman che assime ad AIG e con il rating di Moody dicono che è assicurato... beh...


    “Paulson and [partner Paolo Pellegrini] were eager to find ways to expand their wager against risky mortgages. Accumulating it in the market sometimes proved to be a slow process. So they made appointments with bankers at Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank (NYSE:DB), Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS), and other banks to ask if they would create CDOs that Paulson & Co. could essentially bet against.”


    As Fiderer explains, Paulson asked the banks to create those CDOs “so that they could be sold to some suckers at close to par. That way, Paulson’s hedge fund could approach some other sucker who would sell an insurance policy, or credit default swap, on the newly minted CDOs. Bear, Deutsche and Goldman knew perfectly well what Paulson’s motivation was. He made no secret of his belief that the CDOs subordinate claims on the mortgage collateral were close to worthless. By the time others have figured out the fatal flaws in these securities which had been ignored by the rating agencies, Paulson could collect up to $5 billion..

    Paulson not only initiated these transactions, he also specified the terms he wanted, identifying which mortgages would be stuffed into the CDOs, and how the CDOs should be structured. Within the overall framework set by Paulson’s team, banks and investors were allowed to do some minor tweakin.”

    It is not clear which banks ultimately participated in Paulson’s scam, but Fiderer quotes Bear Stearns trader Scott Eichel as saying that his bank refused. “It didn’t pass the ethics standards;” Eichel said, “it was a reputation issue and it didn’t pass our moral compass^. We didn’t think we could sell deals that someone was shorting on the other side.” Bear Stearns’ moral compass was usually pointed towards the darker regions, but perhaps this is why Paulson subsequently became one of the more eager short sellers of Bear Stearns’ stock.

    Fiderer continues: “Prior to 2006, there were not many opportunities for naked short selling on subprime securitizations. But in January of that year, investment banks launched a new product, which enabled Paulson to place those bets on a large scale. The ABX index, a sort of Dow Jones Average of subprime mortgage securities, facilitated benchmarking the price of credit default swaps.”

    In fact, it was a black box company called the Markit Group that created the ABX index. The banks were minor shareholders in Markit Group and provided data. I have noted in a previous blog that the Markit Group is a dubious outfit to say the least, and there is good reason to suspect that the direction of the ABX index was influenced by hedge fund managers and their allies at the big banks. I do not have evidence that Paulson was one of those hedge funds, but authorities ought to be asking questions.

    Fiderer goes on to suggest that bad loans to homeowners were a significant cause of the financial crisis. On this front, I disagree with him. Certainly, some mortgage lenders were unscrupulous, and there was a certain amount of predatory lending, but the conventional wisdom that this is what crashed the economy is simply false.

    At the time that the mortgage securities markets began to go south in 2007, defaults on subprime loans had increased only slightly month-to-month, and were in fact considerably lower than in earlier years. In the second quarter of 2007, for example, only 7.7 percent of subprime loans were 30 days past due, slightly up from 6.76 percent in the second quarter of 2006, but considerably lower than the 9.9 percent in the second quarter of 2001.

    The problem lied not in the loans themselves, but in the fact that the loans had been packaged (apparently, to a large extent, at the behest of John Paulson and perhaps other bearish billionaires) into fraudulent securities that were traded and probably manipulated by a select number of hedge funds and large banks. In a somewhat similar scheme, hedge funds often pump up the stock of public companies before initiating short selling attacks aimed at demolishing those same companies.

    The economy was brought to its knees by a few powerful and eminently dirty players on Wall Street, not by poor people who had the temerity to buy themselves houses.
     
  12. 16 Febbraio 2010
  13. stockuccio

    stockuccio Guest



    mah ... 'ufficialmente' pare di si Move Over China: Beijing Sells Whopping $34.2 Billion Treasuries In December As Japan Becomes Largest Official Holder Of US Debt | zero hedge
     
  14. 16 Febbraio 2010
  15. stockuccio

    stockuccio Guest


    spero i capoccia europei stiano lustrando gli stivali


    What is John Paulson doing in Greece? By Kevin Connor • Feb 15, 2010 at 12:29 EST

    Goldman Sachs’s Greek adventure got an in-depth look from the New York Times yesterday. The article extends on last week’s Spiegel piece, which reported that the bank helped Greece hide the true extent of its debt through the use of specialized derivative products. We first reported on the parallels between AIG and Greece in a post last week, following the lead of Zero Hedge. Entry into the paper of record means the story now has legs this side of the pond, and MIT economist Simon Johnson is arguing that Goldman Sachs is set to be blacklisted in Europe.
    One question looming over this story: did Goldman position itself to profit from the Greek fiasco? Did it use its special knowledge of Greek’s hidden debt to build profitable bets on its future downfall and rescue? If the bank’s past behavior is any guide, the answer is yes. Ignoring the impending catastrophe (obvious from their vantage point), and failing to properly “hedge” (extract massive profits), would have been “irresponsible” (insufficiently greedy/corrupt) on the part of senior management.
    Considering this, hedge fund king John Paulson’s role in Greece deserves far more scrutiny. I wrote about this last week, pointing out that they shared the same vulture flight pattern in Greece, but at the time did not realize that Paulson and Goldman actually partnered in executing massive and profitable bets against the subprime market. Are they doing the same with Greece?

    News of Paulson’s fund taking large positions against Greek debt has barely risen above rumor in the English-language press, despite this article in a Greek daily, which says that Paulson is “orchestrating the pressure on Greek government bonds and the Euro,” and reports that Paulson has a team of 20-30 traders focused on Greece.
    [​IMG]In Greece, protesters rally against the government's austerity measures. The banner reads "We are struggling to live."

    A research firm is now calling Paulson the George Soros of derivatives markets, where the bulk of speculation against European debt and the Euro is happening; the Telegraph says that so far “no hedge fund has put its head above the parapet in this destructive trade,” but the rumor is that Paulson is behind it.
    If Paulson is the hedge fund king behind the parapet, as rumored in English and reported in Greek, then it would seem fairly likely that Paulson and Goldman partnered — colluded? — to build profitable short positions against Greek debt. That Goldman was shepherding hedge fund client Paulson around Athens in recent weeks would seem to suggest that the bank and hedge fund are working together in Greece.
    Paulson and Goldman have partnered before — on the subprime short trades that won them enormous profits in the midst of the housing crisis. Those trades have gotten a lot of attention, but the fact that Paulson and Goldman worked together to make it all happen has received much less ink. The story of Paulson’s investments is detailed in Gregory Zuckerman’s book, The Greatest Trade Ever. Goldman plays a prominent role, setting up the CDOs that Paulson would wager against, and then selling them to investors. The star Goldman trader who placed the bank’s winning bets against the subprime market, Josh Birnbaum, was reportedly in frequent contact with Paulson, at one point encouraging him to back off his bets (perhaps to make more room for Goldman).
    Since Paulson was in the room with Goldman (and several other banks) when these CDOs were first conceived, it would seem that the fund had an unfair edge over the investors that would lose their shirt buying the securities. Zuckerman notes that Deutsche Bank suffered losses because it couldn’t find takers; that famous taker, AIG, may have been Goldman’s convenient solution.
    These parallels raise obvious questions: was Paulson also in the room with Goldman before it tried to sell Greece on a new way to hide its debt this past November? As a hedge fund client of Goldman’s, did Paulson have special information about Greece’s true debt situation? Are Goldman and Paulson partnering, once again, to profit from the downfall of an entire country/continent?
     
  16. 16 Febbraio 2010
  17. troppidebiti

    troppidebiti New Member

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  18. 17 Febbraio 2010
  19. stockuccio

    stockuccio Guest

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