Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi (2 lettori)

stockuccio

Guest
Depression 2010 - Western Fiat-Money Finished?



Sluggish economy leaves many Japanese in the cold ... The global economy may be on the mend, but times are still tough for the masses of homeless, jobless people in Tokyo, where the only meal of the day is often a bowl of rice handed out by charities. Although Japan's export-driven economy is back on track, largely due to rising demand from Asia, the United Nations said its recovery was slower than other countries, and predicted only 0.9 percent growth in 2010 compared to 8.8 percent for China and 2.1 percent for the United States. This sluggish growth, combined with troubles at giant corporations in the world's second-biggest economy, has made earning a living very difficult for scores of Japanese. "I see no jobs around. It's a really tough situation," Eizo Tsuruga, a 50-year-old homeless man, told Reuters as he sat among others people eating a bowl of hot rice in the winter night. A Welfare Ministry survey showed the actual numbers of homeless had fallen to 15,000 in 2009 from 25,000 in 2003. Homeless people in Japan have traditionally been elderly, social dropouts, but with the economic situation, the demographics have changed to include laid-off workers, both young and old, and university graduates unable to find work. On a recent Sunday, more than 400 people flocked to a Tokyo park to receive free meals and blankets distributed by local charity Shinjuku Renraku Kai, more than twice the number of people the charity used to see two years ago. Many had queued for hours to ensure they got some cooked rice, often their only meal for the day. "More and more people of all ages are gathering here," said Kazuaki Kasai, a volunteer who has worked at the charity's distribution point in the park for the past 16 years. - Yahoo
Dominant Social Theme: Sometimes the global economy is down, and sometimes up.
Free-Market Analysis: Is the Western world struggling through a bad patch? Our argument, voiced with various levels of clarity at various times, is that the West is currently living through a failure of fiat money - specifically a failure of the global anchor currency: the greenback. The dollar is on its way out not because people want it to be necessarily (though some do) but simply because it is failing as a fiat currency. Central bank fiat currencies always fail. China had a number of fiat episodes and the populace was so scarred that fiat money was reportedly even banned in the 1800s. Here's a bit of history on China's melancholy brushes with unbacked paper money:
Fiat Money - China -- Flying Money
When the Chinese first started using paper money, they called it "flying money," because it could just fly from your hands. The reason for the issuance of paper money is simple. There was a copper shortage, so banks had switched to the use of iron coinage. These iron coins became over-issued and fell in value.
In the 11th century, a bank in the Szechuan province of China issued paper money in exchange for the iron coins. Initially, this was fine, because the paper money was exchangeable for gold, silver, or silk. Eventually, inflation began to take hold, as China was funding an ongoing war with the Mongols, which it eventually lost.
Genghis Khan won this war, but the Mongols didn't assume immediate control over China as they pushed westward to conquer more lands. Genghis Khan's grandson Kublai Khan united China and assumed the emperorship. After running into some setbacks with paper currency, Kublai eventually had some success with fiat money. In fact, Marco Polo said of Kublai Khan and the use of paper currency:
"You might say that [Kublai] has the secret of alchemy in perfection...the Khan causes every year to be made such a vast quantity of this money, which costs him nothing, that it must equal in amount all the treasure of the world."
Even Helicopter Ben would be impressed. Marco Polo went on to say:
"This was the most brilliant period in the history of China. Kublai Khan, after subduing and uniting the whole country and adding Burma, Cochin China, and Tonkin to the empire, entered upon a series of internal improvements and civil reforms, which raised the country he had conquered to the highest rank of civilization, power, and progress. ...
"Population and trade had greatly increased, but the emissions of paper notes were suffered to largely outrun both...All the beneficial effects of a currency that is allowed to expand with a growth of population and trade were now turned into those evil effects that flow from a currency emitted in excess of such growth. These effects were not slow to develop themselves...The best families in the empire were ruined, a new set of men came into the control of public affairs, and the country became the scene of internecine warfare and confusion." (- Daily Reckoning)
Interestingly, we can see in the above observations that fiat money first created a wonderland of progress and amusement. That's just what fiat money has done in the West and in Japan as well. It is now happening in China. Wherever fiat money travels it brings tremendous euphoria in its wake, though only to begin with. Cities are energized with false booms. Farm children flock to the urban environment to take jobs in factories producing ephemeral goods or work at useless government jobs - that are created from tax revenues during the boom time. Initially, because fiat money inevitably has a relationship to government, much of the perfection of society is attributed to a wise, fair-minded bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, by the way, believes it.
Monetary stimulation can go on for years. In America, it's been going on for nearly a century - which is probably the far end of what can be expected. But people can live and die under a central banking regime - which is usually a fiat regime (or ends up that way, anyway). Yes, it cannot be emphasized enough that fiat money (along with its enabler, central banking) is a foundational curse. Just as in China, it funds wars, makes the government look wonderfully efficient and even omnipotent, fools people into believing that the non-essential jobs they have are actually essential "modern" work - and sets the stage inevitably for regulatory regimes that must eventually descend into madness and ruin.
Fiat money empowers corporatism (in the modern age anyway) and distorts civilization by helping to implode agrarian republicanism. It is no coincidence that Thomas Jefferson despised central banking - and was in fact the most famous and influential agrarian republican. We can see the remnants of this sort of society in Switzerland, which has passed laws to maintain small farms. It is difficult to create a totalitarian society - even an ephemeral one - in a land of sturdy farmers. Such individuals grow their own food, have access to water and are willing to defend their land. America was a bit like Switzerland before the Civil War but is not now.
But today, dear reader, we would propose that the West, and the entire globe, is living through a fiat money collapse. Economies all over the world have been inflated to their fullest and people can buy no more useless gadgets and work at no more superfluous jobs. Too many useful endeavors have been marginalized and phony ones have been elevated. An implosion is taking place. The world is reverting to a kind of mathematical practicality. In America, car companies have shrunk because there are too many cars, and houses are not being built because there are too many houses. Banks are not doing deals because too many deals have been done. All that is working overtime are the printing presses. While the greenback is exceptionally at risk we would argue that the same thing is occurring, to a greater or lesser degree, in Europe, in Japan, and even in China - despite all the happy talk about the Chinese miracle. Here's a famous investor on the subject of China:
Contrarian Investor Sees Economic Crash in China ... James S. Chanos built one of the largest fortunes on Wall Street by foreseeing the collapse of Enron and other highflying companies whose stories were too good to be true. Now Mr. Chanos, a wealthy hedge fund investor, is working to bust the myth of the biggest conglomerate of all: China Inc. As most of the world bets on China to help lift the global economy out of recession, Mr. Chanos is warning that China's hyper-stimulated economy is headed for a crash, rather than the sustained boom that most economists predict. Its surging real estate sector, buoyed by a flood of speculative capital, looks like "Dubai times 1,000 -- or worse," he frets. He even suspects that Beijing is cooking its books, faking, among other things, its eye-popping growth rates of more than 8 percent. "Bubbles are best identified by credit excesses, not valuation excesses," he said in a recent appearance on CNBC. "And there's no bigger credit excess than in China." (- New York Times)
Everywhere, major economies are having difficulty. We do not believe by the way that it is absolute serendipity. The power elite knows very well how fiat money and central banking work. Those at the top of the economic food chain readily anticipated more power falling into their laps - and ultimately facilitating a worldwide economic regime. But we have to re-emphasize that these same powerful people apparently did not take the Internet into account. This is most important.
Conclusion: By putting in place the mechanisms that guarantee endless quasi-collapses, the power elite profits inordinately. By not understanding that this time around the entire circus would be available for endless replays on the Internet, the power elite has put the system into tremendous jeopardy. Too many have run across free-market arguments on the Internet and come to believe (this time around) that the system is unfair and even impractical. Too many have witnessed and comprehended the full gamut of central banking's apparent destructive tendencies. None of this was in the game plan, in our opinion. Yet this seeming unraveling of financial certainty has tremendous ramifications for your portfolios, dear reader. We might suggest a modicum of gold and silver as you watch various fiat money economies of the world, especially the dollar, sputter and sink.







freddie (il governo, il debito pubblico statunitense) compra oltre 300 miliardi ... almeno dice http://www.housingwire.com/2010/02/10/freddie-mac-will-buy-out-120-day-delinquent-mortgages/




Feb. 10 (Bloomberg) -- More than a fifth of U.S. homeowners owed more than their properties were worth in the fourth quarter as the number of houses and condominiums lost to foreclosure climbed to a record, according to Zillow.com.
In the fourth quarter, 21.4 percent of owners of mortgaged homes were underwater, up from 21 percent in the previous three months and down from 23 percent in the second quarter, the Seattle-based real estate data provider said today in a report. More than one in 1,000 homes were repossessed by lenders in December, the highest rate in Zillow data dating back to 2000.
Underwater homes are more likely lost to foreclosure because their owners have a harder time refinancing or selling when they get behind on loan payments. U.S. home values dropped 5 percent in the fourth quarter from a year earlier, the 12th straight quarter of year-over-year declines, Zillow said.
“While the next few months are likely to bring further home value declines in most markets, we do expect to see a national bottom in home prices by the middle of this year,” Zillow Chief Economist Stan Humphries said in a statement. “Thereafter, home values are likely to bounce along the bottom with real appreciation remaining negligible for some time.”
There were 2.82 million foreclosures in the U.S. last year, according to RealtyTrac Inc., the most since the data provider began compiling figures in 2005. The number may rise to 3 million in 2010, the Irvine, California-based company said last month.
Bank sales of foreclosed properties accounted for a fifth of all U.S. home sales in December, Zillow said. Such transactions made up 68 percent of sales in Merced, California; 64 percent in the Las Vegas area; and 62 percent in Modesto, California, the company said.
Almost 29 percent of homes sold in the U.S. went for less than their sellers originally paid for them, Zillow said.
The closely held company uses data from public records going back to 1996. Its mortgage figures come from information filed with individual counties.
 
Ultima modifica di un moderatore:

stockuccio

Guest
Zibordi di cobraf ieri

Il "tempismo" del crac è per questa estate al massimo, è quasi matematico che non possa essere oltre, l'incognita è da dove inizi, se dalle borse, dal dollaro o altre valute come la sterlina su cui si crea un panico, dai titoli di stato USA o inglesi o giapponesi. Ma come tempistica da diciamo forse fine aprile per stare sicuri devi fare dei piani precisi perchè può essere un evento traumatico. Il "tempismo" del crac è "da Maggio-Giugno in poi..." per motivi molto semplici:

1) entro Aprile sia la Banca di Inghilterra che la Federal Reserve avranno cessato tutti i loro acquisti di debito pubblico e di debito cartolarizzato lanciato all'inizio dell'anno scorso. La la Banca di Inghilterra ha in realtà già finito con la settimana scorsa e non a caso la prima piccola slavina dei mercati ha coinciso con la decisione degli inglesi di terminare il cosiddetto "quantitative easing" (espressione inglese elegante ed intraducibile in italiano in senso letterale che significa: Stampano-Moneta-e-la-Usano-per Comprare-Titoli di stato e titoli del debito cartolarizzato con dentro mutui e altro)

2) tutti i cedimenti di borsa seri sono sempre iniziati tra Maggio e inizio Settembre, le uniche eccezioni le hai quando hai avuto un crollo giù prima così spettacolare, come nel 2008, che per forza di cose se hai perso un -50% nei 12 mesi precedenti un rimbalzo lo fai poi anche "non stagionale". Ma quando il mercato è orso e nei 6-10 mesi è precedenti è stato positivo il cedimento è sempre concentrato tra giugno e settembre, a volte si anticipa a maggio.

3) La Cina ha iniziato una prima stretta del credito a metà gennaio e gli effetti si sentiranno tra circa 3-4 mesi con un crollo dell'immobiliare. la Cina ha "toppato" come mercato con i soliti sei mesi di anticipo come nel 2007, il top dell'indice di Shangai è stato il 2 agosto 2009 e il top delle borse occidentali il 10 gennaio scorso 5 mesi e mezzo prima, nel 2007 furono sei mesi pure di distanza. Se tutto va come previsto dovresti vedere Shangai a -50% dal top del 2 agosto entro maggio-giugno, al momento ha fatto -22% dal top del 2 agosto, non sembra ma sta franando veramente assieme alla Spagna e Grecia. Se entro maggio-giugno hai Shangai a -50% dal top del 2 agosto allora hai la conferma

4) In autunno in USA ci sono delle elezioni per Congresso e Senato e dato il trend catastrofico dell'occupazione un due mesi prima circa i politici con seggi contesi ed Obama andranno nel panico e cominceranno a menare colpi a destra e a sinistra

5) l'effetto delle misure straordinarie (tassi di interesse a zero, "quantitative easing", salvataggi diretti di banche, aumenti di spesa sociale e pubblica...) lanciate tra fine 2008 e inizio 2009 comincerà a ridursi dopo un anno circa e i deficit dei singoli stati USA e dei paesi più indebitati sono tutte bombe ad orolegeria che peggiorano già ora di mese in mese, ci sono almeno 10 stati USA, California, Nevada, New Jersey, Wisconsin... che sono messi come la Grecia

6) Come ciliega sulla torta hai la "tensione con l'Iran" che non rimarrà così sempre sospesa in modo indefinito se leggi le dichiarazioni degli ultimi mesi e settimane e troverà un qualche sbocco. Le guerre in Medio Oriente ed altrove sono state sempre in questo periodo che coincide con quello "Orso" per le borse di giugno-settembre:
(I Guerra Mondiale : agosto 1914, II Guerra Mondiale: 2 settembre 1939, Operazione Barbarossa: giugno 1941, Guerra dei Sei Giorni: 10 giugno 1967, Guerra dello Yom Kippur: settembre 1974, Guerra del Golfo in Kuwait: 2 agosto 1990, Strage delle Due Torri: 11 settembre 2001...)
 

The Beast

Rating? No grazie!
Zibordi di cobraf ieri


6) Come ciliega sulla torta hai la "tensione con l'Iran" che non rimarrà così sempre sospesa in modo indefinito se leggi le dichiarazioni degli ultimi mesi e settimane e troverà un qualche sbocco. Le guerre in Medio Oriente ed altrove sono state sempre in questo periodo che coincide con quello "Orso" per le borse di giugno-settembre:
(I Guerra Mondiale : agosto 1914, II Guerra Mondiale: 2 settembre 1939, Operazione Barbarossa: giugno 1941, Guerra dei Sei Giorni: 10 giugno 1967, Guerra dello Yom Kippur: settembre 1974, Guerra del Golfo in Kuwait: 2 agosto 1990, Strage delle Due Torri: 11 settembre 2001...)


...va beh, si era già in piena Seconda Guerra Mondiale....
questo mi sembra un pò troppo fantapoliticalfinanza....

e all'appello ne mancano di guerre! Vietnam, Korea, IRAN-IRAQ.... i mesi sono 12, le guerre nel 1900 MOOOOOOLTE di più.
 

Geller

Banned
Economia USA in ripresina ... : - )

Usa: richieste sussidi a 440.000 unita'

Il dato e' migliore delle stime degli analisti

(ANSA) - ROMA, 11 FEB - Le richieste di sussidio di disoccupazione negli Stati Uniti sono calate di 43.000 unita' la settimana scorsa, a quota 440.000. Il dato e' migliore delle stime degli analisti, che prevedevano un calo a 465.000 unita' dalle 480.000 (dato rivisto oggi al rialzo a 483.000) della settimana precedente.

:up:

Un dato come questo è positivo; un altro segnalino inequivocabile di ripresina. ;)
 

stockuccio

Guest
delle regole se ne strafregano comunque :( New off-balance sheet rule: Little impact on Wells | Analysis & Opinion | Reuters

consolidano 10 miliardi di SPEs e VIEs con oltre 2000 fuori bilancio


lo ritiro su per Ricpast, Geller o chi vuole ... se c'è qualcuno in grado di dirmi quanto vale Wells Fargo si faccia avanti

per la riforma delle banche FT.com / Video & Audio / Interactive graphics - The Obama banking plan explained

anche il New Jersey dopo la California defaulta New Jersey governor declares fiscal emergency | Reuters
 

Geller

Banned
lo ritiro su per Ricpast, Geller o chi vuole ... se c'è qualcuno in grado di dirmi quanto vale Wells Fargo si faccia avanti

per la riforma delle banche FT.com / Video & Audio / Interactive graphics - The Obama banking plan explained

anche il New Jersey dopo la California defaulta New Jersey governor declares fiscal emergency | Reuters

In una fase di ripresa economica i 2000 mld USD fuori bilancio dovrebbero venire lentamente e parzialmente ridimensionati.
Almeno questa è la legittima speranza.
Allo stato di fatto, i tecnici finanziari dell'Amministrazione Obama monitorano day by day l'evolversi della situazione patrimoniale delle grandi banche e danno disposizione ai vari cda, tramite i rappresentanti del Governo, sulle attività necessarie a proseguire con successo nella delicata fase di "convalescenza". :rolleyes:
 

METHOS

Forumer storico
Nuvole dense all'orizzonte....

EURO: JUNCKER LANCIA L'ALLARME SULLA "DERIVA" DELLE ECONOMIE UE
di WSI-AGI
"Un'unione monetaria non puo' durare a lungo se le attuali divergenze nei conti pubblici diventeranno troppo grandi". Le bugie di Bonaiuti (presidenza del Consiglio): "l'Italia e' fuori dalla crisi". E Draghi si dissocia.

Il presidente dell'Eurogruppo, Jean-Claude Juncker lancia l'allarme sulla deriva che rischiano di prendere alcune economie dell'Eurozona. "Dobbiamo stare attenti - dice Juncker al giornale Sueddeutsche Zeitung - che le attuali divergenze non si amplino. Un'unione monetaria non puo' durare a lungo se le attuali divergenze nei conti pubblici diventeranno troppo grandi".

Per i tuoi investimenti, segui il feed in tempo reale di Wall Street Italia INSIDER. Se non sei abbonato, fallo subito: costa solo 0.77 euro al giorno, provalo ora!

BONAIUTI, "NOI SIAMO FUORI DELLA CRISI, LO DICE L'UE"

(AGI) - Roma, 13 feb. - L'Italia e' fuori della crisi grazie al suo sistema di piccole e medie imprese. Lo ribadisce il sottosegretario alla presidenza del Consiglio Paolo Bonaiuti: "In Italia le piccole e medie imprese hanno sostenuto l'economia con grande elasticita'. Per questo l'Osce, il Fmi e l'Unione Europea hanno riconosciuto che l'Italia e' uscita dalla crisi".

L'Italia e' proprio tra i paesi a cui allude, senza nominarli, il presidente dell'Eurogruppo Jean-Claude Juncker, quando afferma che "un'unione monetaria non puo' durare a lungo se le attuali divergenze nei conti pubblici diventeranno troppo grandi". Ripetiamo quanto scritto qui su WSI: "La Grecia e' sotto attacco perche' ha un deficit al 13% del Pil; bene, ma che senso ha, a questo punto, quel parametro del 3% fissato dal Trattato di Maastricht? Il debito pubblico greco e' al 125% del Pil (quello dell'Italia al 118%) mentre le griglie europee parlano di un limite massimo del 60%. Allora: rivediamo tutti gli schemi e regole UE, oppure preferiamo salvare quei paesi "deboli" del Club Med oggi viziati e "drogati" dal loro finto benessere? Diciamo l'ovvio: sara' impossibile ottenere dalla Grecia e dagli altri stati P.I.I.G.S. il rientro nei parametri entro tempi rispettabili. Per questo l'euro e' una moneta ipervalutata mentre vale di fatto tanto quanto valgono i fondamentali del piu' tenue anello della catena, in questo momento la Grecia. Ogni catena si spezza sul suo link debole anche se gli altri anelli sono fatti di titanio indistruttibile. Crediamo quindi ci pensera' il mercato finanziario a smascherare l'ipocrisia dei nostri burocrati europei, nelle settimane che verranno.(l.c.)
 

stockuccio

Guest
se non sai bene che compri .... chettecompri ?



Just what is the real level of government debt in Europe?

Posted by Edward Hugh on 14 February 2010 at 11:00 pm


This is a post by Edward Hugh, who also blogs at Global Economy Matters.

“If you don’t fully understand an instrument, don’t buy it.”
To the above advice from Emilio Botín, Executive Chairman of Spain’s Grupo Santander, I would simply add one small rider: Don’t sell it either, especially if you are a national government trying to structure your country’s debt.
In a fascinating article in today’s New York Times, journalists Louise Story, Landon Thomas and Nelson Schwartz begin to recount the murky story of just how the major US investment banks have been able to earn considerable sums of money effectively helping European governments to disguise their growing mountain of public debt.
Wall Street tactics akin to the ones that fostered subprime mortgages in America have worsened the financial crisis shaking Greece and undermining the euro by enabling European governments to hide their mounting debts.
As worries over Greece rattle world markets, records and interviews show that with Wall Street’s help, the nation engaged in a decade-long effort to skirt European debt limits. One deal created by Goldman Sachs helped obscure billions in debt from the budget overseers in Brussels.
Even as the crisis was nearing the flashpoint, banks were searching for ways to help Greece forestall the day of reckoning. In early November — three months before Athens became the epicenter of global financial anxiety — a team from Goldman Sachs arrived in the ancient city with a very modern proposition for a government struggling to pay its bills, according to two people who were briefed on the meeting. The bankers, led by Goldman’s president, Gary D. Cohn, held out a financing instrument that would have pushed debt from Greece’s health care system far into the future, much as when strapped homeowners take out second mortgages to pay off their credit cards.
In fact, concerns about what it is exactly Goldman Sachs have been up to in Greece are not new, and the Financial Times have been pursuing this story for some time, in particular in connection with the investment bank’s ill fated attempt to persuade the Chinese to buy Greek government debt (and here, and here). Nor is the fact that the Greek government resorted to sophisticated financial instruments to cover its tracks exactly breaking news, since I (among others) have been writing about this topic since the middle of January – Does Anyone Really Know The Size Of The Greek 2009 Deficit? – following the arrival in my inbox of a leaked copy of the report the Greek Finance Minister sent to the EU Commission detailing the issues.
What is new in today’s report from the NYT team is the extent to which they identify the problem as a much more general one, involving more banks and more countries, since “Instruments developed by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and a wide range of other banks enabled politicians to mask additional borrowing in Greece, Italy and possibly elsewhere”. I very strongly suggest that our NYT stalwarts take a long hard look at what has been going on in Spain, and especially at the Autonomous Community level.
So the question naturally arises, just how much in debt are our governments, really? As the NYT team point out, Eurostat has long been grappling with this matter, and as far back as 2002 they found themselves forced to change their accounting rules, in order to try to enforce the disclosure of many off-balance sheet entities that had previously escaped detection by the EU, since up to that point the transactions involved had been classified as asset “sales”, often of public buildings and the like. Following advice paid for from the best of investment banks many European governments simply responded to the rule change by reformulating their suspect deals as loans rather than outright sales. As we say in Spain “hecha la ley, hecha la trampa” (or in English, when you close one loophole you open another). According to the NYT authors:
As recently as 2008, Eurostat…. reported that “in a number of instances, the observed securitization operations seem to have been purportedly designed to achieve a given accounting result, irrespective of the economic merit of the operation.”
So just what is all the fuss about. Well, in plain and simple terms it is about an accounting item known as “receivables”. Now, according to the Wikipedia entry:
“Accounts receivable (A/R) is one of a series of accounting transactions dealing with the billing of a customers for goods and services received by the customers. In most business entities this is typically done by generating an invoice and mailing or electronically delivering it to the customer, who in turn must pay it within an established timeframe called credit or payment terms.”
However, as we can learn from another Wikipedia entry, often the use of “accounts receivable” constitutes a form of factoring, and this is where the problems Eurostat are concerned about actually start:
Factoring is a financial transaction whereby a business sells its accounts receivable (i.e., invoices) to a third party (called a factor) at a discount in exchange for immediate money with which to finance continued business. Factoring differs from a bank loan in three main ways. First, the emphasis is on the value of the receivables (essentially a financial asset), not the firm’s credit worthiness. Secondly, factoring is not a loan – it is the purchase of a financial asset (the receivable). Finally, a bank loan involves two parties whereas factoring involves three.
But how does all this work in practice? Well, the World Wide Web is a wonderful thing, since you have so much information near to hand, at just the twitch of a fingertip. Here is a useful description of what are known as PPI/PFI schemes, from UK building contractor John Laing:
A Public Private Partnership (PPP) is an umbrella term for Government schemes involving the private business sector in public sector projects.
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is a form of PPP developed by the Government in which the public and private sectors join to design, build or refurbish, finance and operate (DBFO) new or improved facilities and services to the general public. Under the most common form of PFI, a private sector provider like John Laing will, through a Special Purpose Company (SPC), hold a DBFO contract for facilities such as hospitals, schools, and roads according to specifications provided by public sector departments. Over a typical period of 25-30 years, the private sector provider is paid an agreed monthly (or unitary) fee by the relevant public body (such as a Local Council or a Health Trust) for the use of the asset(s), which at that time is owned by the PFI provider. This and other income enables the repayment of the senior debt over the concession length. (Senior debt is the major source of funding, typically 90% of the required capital, provided by banks or bond finance). Asset ownership usually returns to the public body at the end of the concession. In this manner, improvements to public services can be made without upfront public sector funds; and while under contract, the risks associated with such huge capital commitments are shared between parties, allocated appropriately to those best able to manage each one.
And for those still in the dark, Wikipedia just one more time comes to the rescue:
The private finance initiative (PFI) is a method to provide financial support for “public-private partnerships” (PPPs) between the public and private sectors. Developed initially by the Australian and United Kingdom governments, PFI has now also been adopted (under various guises) in Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, and the United States (amongst others) as part of a wider program for privatization and deregulation driven by corporations, national governments, and international bodies such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank.
PFI contracts are currently off-balance-sheet, meaning that they do not show up as part of the national debt as measured by government statistics such as the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). The technical reason for this is that the government authority taking out the PFI contract pays a single charge (the ‘Unitary Charge’) for both the initial capital spend and the on-going maintenance and operation costs. This means that the entire contract is classed as revenue spending rather than capital spending. As a result neither the capital spend nor the long-term revenue obligation appears on the government’s balance sheet. Were the total PFI liability to be shown on the UK balance sheet it would greatly increase the UK national debt.
And here are two more examples of what is involved which were brought to light by a quick Google. First of all, the case of Italian health payments. Now according to analysts Patrizio Messina and Alessia Denaro, in this report I found online from Financial Consultants Orrick:
In the last years many structured finance transactions (either securitisation transactions or asset finance transactions) have been structured in relation to the so called healthcare receivables.The reasons are several. On one side, the providers of healthcare goods and services usually are not paid in time by the relevant healthcare authorities and therefore, in order to gain liquidity, usually assign their receivables toward the healthcare authorities. On the other side, due to the recent legislation that provides for very high interest rates on late payments, the debtors as well as banks and other investors have had the same and opposite interest on carrying out different kind of transactions. In this brief article we will analyse, after a quick description of the Italian healthcare system, some of the different structures that have been used in relation to transactions concerning healthcare receivables and, in particular, we will focus on transactions concerning the so called “raw receivables”, which are lately increasing in the Italian market practice, by analysing the legal means through which it is possible to ascertain/recover such receivables.
This system thus has two advantages (apart from the fact that it effectively hides debt). In the first place the healthcare providers gain liquidity in order to continue to run hospitals, pay doctors, etc, while those who effectively intermediate the transaction earn very high interest rates for their efforts, interest payments which have to be deducted from next years health care provision, and so on.
As the Orrick report points out, Italy’s national healthcare service (servizio sanitarionazionale, “nhs”) is regulated by the legislative decree of December 30, 1992, no. 502 (“decree 502/92”).The reform introduced by decree 502/92, as amended from time to time, provides for a three-tier system for the healthcare service, as outlined below: State level The central government provides a national legislation limited to very general features of the NHS and decides the funds to be allocated to the single regions according to specific criteria (density of population, etc.) for the NHS.
As the Orrick analysts note: “the Healthcare Authorities usually pay the relevant Providers with a certain delay”.
Usually, when healthcare funds are allocated, in the national provisional budget, the central government underestimates the amount of healthcare expenditure. Since the central government does not provide regions with enough funds, regions are not able to provide enough funds to Healthcare Authorities, and payments to the Providers are delayed. Since the Providers need liquidity, they usually assign their receivables toward the Healthcare Authorities. To deal with all the above issues, Italian market practice has been developing an alternative system of financing through securitisation and asset finance transactions of Healthcare Receivables.
As the analysts finally conclude:
Despite of the risks concerning the judicial proceedings, Italian market players are still very interested on carrying on securitisation transaction on this kind of asset, principally because Legislative Decree no. 231/02 provides for very high interest rates on late payments (equal to the interest rate applied by ECB plus 7%) – my emphasis
Another technique Eurostat have identified as a means of concealing debt relates to the recording of military equipment expenditure, as described in this report I found dating from 2006. At the time Eurostat were worried about the growing provision of military equipment under leasing agreements. Basically they decided that such provision was debt accumulative.
Eurostat has decided that leases of military equipment organised by the private sector should be considered as financial leases, and not as operating leases. This supposes recording an acquisition of equipment by the government and the incurrence of a government liability to the lessor. Thus there is an impact on government deficit and debt at the time that the equipment is put at the disposal of the military authorities, and not at the time of payments on the lease. Those payments are then assimilated as debt servicing, with a part recorded as interest and the remainder as a financial transaction.
However, a loophole was found in the case of long term equipment purchases:
Military equipment contracts often involve the gradual delivery over many years of a number of the same or similar pieces of equipment, such as aircraft or armoured vehicles, or including significant service components, such as training. Moreover, in the case of complex systems, it is frequently the case that some completion tasks need to be performed for the equipment to be operational at full potential capacity. Some military programmes are based on the combination of several kinds of equipment that may be completed in different periods, so that the expenditure may be spread over several fiscal years before the system, globally considered, becomes fully operational.
In cases of long-term contracts where deliveries of identical items are staged over a long period of time, or where payments cover the provision of both goods and services, government expenditure should be recorded at the time of the actual delivery of each independent part of the equipment, or of the provision of service.
Payment for such items are only to be classified as debt at the time of registering the actual delivery, which may explain why, if my information is correct, the Greek military as of last December were still officially “testing” two submarines which had been provided by German contractors, since final delivery had still to be formally registered, and the debt accounted.
A lot of information about the kind of things which were going on before the 2006 rule change can be found in this online presentation from Europlace Financial Forum. Here are some examples of private/public sector cooperation in Italy.

And here’s a chart showing a list of advantages and possible applications:

Now, at the end of the day, you may ask “what is wrong with all of this”? Well quite simply, like Residential Mortgage Backed Securities these are instruments that work while they work, and cause a lot of additional headaches when they don’t. I can think of three reasons why debt acquired in this way in the past may now be problematic.
a) they assume a certain level of headline GDP growth to furnish revenue growth to the public agencies committed to making the payments. Following the crisis these previous levels of assumed growth are now unlikely to be realised.
b) they assume growing workforces and working age populations, but both these, as we know, are now likely to start declining in many European countries.
c) they assume unchanging dependency ratios between active and dependent populations, but these assumptions, as we also already know, are no longer valid, as our population pyramids steadily invert.
Given all this, a very real danger exists that what were previously considered as obscure securitisation instruments, so obscure that few politicians really understood their implications, and few citizens actually knew of their existence, can suddenly find themselves converted into little better than a glorified Ponzi scheme.
And if you want one very concrete example of how unsustainable debt accumulation can lead to problems, you could try reading this report in the Spanish newspaper La Verdad (Spanish, but Google translate if you are interested), where they recount the problems being faced by many Spanish local authorities who are now running out of money, in this case it the village of San Javier they have until the 24 February to pay a debt of 350,000 euros, or the electricity will simply be cut off! The article also details how many other municipalities are having increasing difficulty in paying their employees. And this is just in one region (Murcia), but the problem is much more general, as Spain’s heavily over-indebted local authorities and autonomous communities steadily grind to a halt.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Alto