Obbligazioni MPS (10 lettori)

waltermasoni

Caribbean Trader
Buy new mps 4% 100k a 100,75.
Comprato con la mia banca Svizzera.
Non in collocamento (book chiuso) , no Isin, no grigio ma in una procedura in ‘ chat’ che è una specie di pre-grigio.
Non conosciuta da me.
Magari sul mercato grigio si compra a meno... però una senior preffered per me vede poi altri valori
Queste banche svizzere sono avanti. Procedura fatta come sempre in diretta con private banker e sala operativa

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waltermasoni

Caribbean Trader
Buy new mps 4% 100k a 100,75.
Comprato con la mia banca Svizzera.
Non in collocamento (book chiuso) , no Isin, no grigio ma in una procedura in ‘ chat’ che è una specie di pre-grigio.
Non conosciuta da me.
Magari sul mercato grigio si compra a meno... però una senior preffered per me vede poi altri valori
Queste banche svizzere sono avanti. Procedura fatta come sempre in diretta con private banker e sala operativa

Vedi l'allegato 518223


Otc 101,6-101,9
 

waltermasoni

Caribbean Trader
Fitch Affirms Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena at 'B'; Outlook Stable
12 JUL 2019 09:50 AM ET




Fitch Ratings-Milan/London-12 July 2019: Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA's (MPS) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and Viability Rating (VR) at 'b'. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is Stable.

A full list of rating actions is at the end of this commentary.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT
The ratings reflect MPS's progress in reducing impaired loans and capital encumbrance by unreserved impaired loans mostly through the disposals of non-performing loans, which we expect to continue. The ratings also reflect our view that funding and liquidity are still heavily reliant on state-guaranteed and central bank funding with reasonably short maturities, and that the bank's market access remains uncertain and vulnerable to changes in market sentiment. Fitch believes MPS's ability to generate value from core banking is still limited and that it will take time for the bank to regain competitiveness and restore its profitability to more acceptable and sustainable levels.

MPS's gross (Stage 3) impaired loans ratio was reduced to about 18% at end-2018 from 22% at end-2017 (the latter calculated excluding EUR24.1 billion of securitised doubtful loans formally deconsolidated in 1H18), following the sale of several portfolios of impaired loans and tight control over new impaired loans formation. We estimate that the ratio could fall to about 15% by end-2019 if the bank completes all its disposals initiated at end-1Q19. At this level, MPS's gross impaired loans ratio would still be higher than the domestic industry average (about 10% at end-1Q19) and weak by international standards, but it would be closer to that of higher-rated domestic peers. Management is considering additional opportunities to accelerate balance sheet de-risking. Even if these do not materialise, we expect asset quality to improve gradually on tightened underwriting standards, stronger risk control and continuous disposals.

Despite the above improvement MPS's capitalisation is still not commensurate with risks, in our view. At end-2018 unreserved impaired loans accounted for just below 100% of Fitch Core Capital (FCC) although we recognise that capital encumbrance should improve to more acceptable levels as planned impaired loan disposals continue. MPS's capitalisation is also exposed to sovereign spread risk from the bank's large holding of Italian government bonds, which at end-1Q19 accounted for about 2.6x FCC. Contingent risk also stems from sizable unreserved legal claims.

MPS's CET1 ratio of 13.3% and FCC ratio of 11.6% at end-1Q19 were acceptable. The bank has moderate buffers (about 3.7pp) over its total Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) capital requirement but modest headroom (about 1.2pp) over its overall SREP capital requirement. The latter is tighter than at most domestic banks and limits the bank's ability to absorb potential losses and/or increase business volumes materially.

In our view operating profitability remains weak due to limited revenue generation from core businesses, high restructuring costs and the need to improve coverage on impaired loans ahead of their disposal. We expect MPS's profitability to gradually benefit from normalising loan impairment charges, cost-cutting initiatives and commercial activities aimed at growing business volumes. However, we believe that the ability of MPS to achieve its profitability targets remains highly correlated with economic and interest rate cycles.

State-guaranteed notes and central bank facilities accounted for about a quarter of MPS's total funding at end-1Q19. In Fitch's view, these instruments underpin the bank's funding and liquidity and indirectly provide stability to the bank's deposit base, which has grown by over 30% since end-2016. However, deposit inflows were mostly from corporate clients, which we view as more opportunistic and confidence-sensitive than retail.

Most of the state-guaranteed notes and central bank facilities will expire in the next 18 months. However, the former is mostly held by the bank, while the latter may be refinanced through the third round of Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO-III) by the European Central Bank. Net of these, the refinancing requirement is a more manageable EUR3.2 billion. In 2019 MPS has issued EUR1 billion of covered bonds and EUR500 million of senior unsecured preferred notes, but we believe that MPS's ability to access debt markets remains vulnerable to the risk of reduced investor appetite or challenging market conditions. Additional liquidity may be sourced through repos, as the bank has over EUR22 billion of eligible collateral.

The Stable Outlook on MPS's ratings is based on our expectations that the bank continues to implement its restructuring and that the operating environment does not deteriorate sharply.

MPS's senior unsecured debt is rated in line with the bank's IDRs. Fitch assigns a Recovery Rating of 'RR4' to the debt rating to reflect average recovery prospects for senior bondholders in case of a non-viability event. This is given current buffers of equally ranking senior liabilities (including state-guaranteed notes) and more junior debt available to absorb potential losses as well as the bank's diminishing risks.
 

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