Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
certe notizie le leggo al negativo ...
perderanno la AAA
se a standard&poveri dovesse mai passare in testa di togliergli la triplaaa poi qualche cuomo esce di sicuro e li sbatte in prigione per qualche manchevolezza passata
Derivati USA: CME-CBOT-NYMEX-ICE BUND, TBOND and the middle of the guado (VM 69) (3 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione masgui
- Data di Inizio
se a standard&poveri dovesse mai passare in testa di togliergli la triplaaa poi qualche cuomo esce di sicuro e li sbatte in prigione per qualche manchevolezza passata
Sharnin 2
Forumer storico
Da icebergfinanza:
Ora ascoltate questa, sempre che la notizia sia reale, visto che le parti in causa si sono rifiutate di rilasciare dichiarazioni.
In attesa che la nebbia si dissolva su questa vicenda, DER SPIEGEL Greek Debt Crisis: How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International ci racconta che Goldman Sachs avrebbe aiutato la Grecia ad approfittare di un vuoto normativo al fine di ridurre la vera entità del proprio deficit.
Sembra che i politici greci, all’inizio del 2002, dietro suggerimento degli esperti Goldman Sachs, abbiano messo in piedi un cross-currency-swap, il cui debito pubblico espresso in dollari e yen, è stato espresso in euro per un certo periodo e successivamente riproposto nella divisa originale in data successiva.
Tassi di cambio fittizzi, importi sovradimensionati, crediti supplementari segreti, nulla da dire, il giardino del diavolo è completo, peccato che talvolta dimentichi di coprire le pentole con i coperchi.
Ci manca solo che le banche di affari e i loro analisti ora incomincino a downgradare il debito corporate, delle imprese finanziarie e non, delle varie nazioni sotto tiro e poi il gioco è fatto.
Oggi l'agenzia di rating S&P ha messo sotto osservazione con implicazioni negative il rating delle ex cenerentole finanziarie Citigroup e Bank of America, giocando con i vari rating interni alla struttura finanziaria, alzandone alcuni e diminuendone altri.
Ebbene, non dimenticatevi questi due nomi, come vi ricorda Icebergfinanza da ormai due anni, nell'ordine, Citigroup e Bank of America, sono le probabili prossime candidate alla madre di tutte le nazionalizzazioni della storia.
Ora ascoltate questa, sempre che la notizia sia reale, visto che le parti in causa si sono rifiutate di rilasciare dichiarazioni.
In attesa che la nebbia si dissolva su questa vicenda, DER SPIEGEL Greek Debt Crisis: How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International ci racconta che Goldman Sachs avrebbe aiutato la Grecia ad approfittare di un vuoto normativo al fine di ridurre la vera entità del proprio deficit.
Sembra che i politici greci, all’inizio del 2002, dietro suggerimento degli esperti Goldman Sachs, abbiano messo in piedi un cross-currency-swap, il cui debito pubblico espresso in dollari e yen, è stato espresso in euro per un certo periodo e successivamente riproposto nella divisa originale in data successiva.
Tassi di cambio fittizzi, importi sovradimensionati, crediti supplementari segreti, nulla da dire, il giardino del diavolo è completo, peccato che talvolta dimentichi di coprire le pentole con i coperchi.
Ci manca solo che le banche di affari e i loro analisti ora incomincino a downgradare il debito corporate, delle imprese finanziarie e non, delle varie nazioni sotto tiro e poi il gioco è fatto.
Oggi l'agenzia di rating S&P ha messo sotto osservazione con implicazioni negative il rating delle ex cenerentole finanziarie Citigroup e Bank of America, giocando con i vari rating interni alla struttura finanziaria, alzandone alcuni e diminuendone altri.
Ebbene, non dimenticatevi questi due nomi, come vi ricorda Icebergfinanza da ormai due anni, nell'ordine, Citigroup e Bank of America, sono le probabili prossime candidate alla madre di tutte le nazionalizzazioni della storia.
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
beh prima dei greci a quanto pare l'ha fatto anche l'italia
FT Alphaville Goldman’s Trojan currency swap
Goldman’s Trojan currency swap
Posted by Tracy Alloway on Feb 09 15:25. A curious game of Maastricht criteria hide-and-seek
The Spiegel is reporting that Goldman Sachs helped Greece cover up part of its whopping deficit. The deal was reportedly done via a currency swap, using artificially high exchange rates.
Here’s the relevant bit of the report:
Even with the currency swap, we should note, Greece’s finances have never quite been Maastricht-compliant. Only once in the past 20 years, for instance, has Greece found itself in keeping with the EU edict that fiscal deficits should not exceed 3 per cent of GDP (in 2006).
In any case, Greece’s previous fiscal shortcomings are now well known. The issue is that, as the Spiegel notes, at some point the country will have to pay up for its swap transactions, and that will impact its (current) deficit. The bonds reportedly mature sometime between 2012-2017.
Interestingly, this is not the first time such a currency swap has been used in this way.
The last instance was another porcine-acronym eurozone peripheral country: Italy.
From a 2001 Euromoney article:
Italy, we should note, always insisted the swap was just a way to lock-in foreign currency gains. Furthermore, they say, the thing would only have reduced the country’s debt by 0.02 per cent — not enough to make a difference for Italy’s eurozone-ambitions.
But there was the suggestion the swap was just one part of a series:
Why did the country feel the need to fudge its deficit in 2002 specifically?
And why did Goldman Sachs reportedly want to help it do so?
The Spiegel report has a clue, at least on the Goldman point:
Well, at least for Goldman, if not the Greek banks.
FT Alphaville Goldman’s Trojan currency swap
Goldman’s Trojan currency swap
Posted by Tracy Alloway on Feb 09 15:25. A curious game of Maastricht criteria hide-and-seek
The Spiegel is reporting that Goldman Sachs helped Greece cover up part of its whopping deficit. The deal was reportedly done via a currency swap, using artificially high exchange rates.
Here’s the relevant bit of the report:
Greece’s debt managers agreed a huge deal with the savvy bankers of US investment bank Goldman Sachs at the start of 2002. The deal involved so-called cross-currency swaps in which government debt issued in dollars and yen was swapped for euro debt for a certain period — to be exchanged back into the original currencies at a later date.
Such transactions are part of normal government refinancing. Europe’s governments obtain funds from investors around the world by issuing bonds in yen, dollar or Swiss francs. But they need euros to pay their daily bills. Years later the bonds are repaid in the original foreign denominations.
But in the Greek case the US bankers devised a special kind of swap with fictional exchange rates. That enabled Greece to receive a far higher sum than the actual euro market value of 10 billion dollars or yen. In that way Goldman Sachs secretly arranged additional credit of up to $1 billion for the Greeks.
The loan-cum-currency swap would not have shown up in Greece’s debt statistics, which means it was effectively a way of bypassing the eurozone’s Maastricht criteria, which prescribe certain debt-to-GDP metrics for countries wishing to join the single currency zone.Such transactions are part of normal government refinancing. Europe’s governments obtain funds from investors around the world by issuing bonds in yen, dollar or Swiss francs. But they need euros to pay their daily bills. Years later the bonds are repaid in the original foreign denominations.
But in the Greek case the US bankers devised a special kind of swap with fictional exchange rates. That enabled Greece to receive a far higher sum than the actual euro market value of 10 billion dollars or yen. In that way Goldman Sachs secretly arranged additional credit of up to $1 billion for the Greeks.
Even with the currency swap, we should note, Greece’s finances have never quite been Maastricht-compliant. Only once in the past 20 years, for instance, has Greece found itself in keeping with the EU edict that fiscal deficits should not exceed 3 per cent of GDP (in 2006).
In any case, Greece’s previous fiscal shortcomings are now well known. The issue is that, as the Spiegel notes, at some point the country will have to pay up for its swap transactions, and that will impact its (current) deficit. The bonds reportedly mature sometime between 2012-2017.
Interestingly, this is not the first time such a currency swap has been used in this way.
The last instance was another porcine-acronym eurozone peripheral country: Italy.
From a 2001 Euromoney article:
In May 1995, Italy issued a Y200 billion ($1.6 billion) bond. The exchange rate at that time was Y19.30 to the lira. By December 1996, the yen had depreciated to Y13.40 against the lira. With 12 European countries desperately trying to meet the five criteria for joining the single currency, Italy wanted to hedge its foreign exchange gains, so it entered into a currency swap with a foreign bank.
But the swap had some peculiar features. The rate on the swap was Y19.30 to the lira, the exchange rate at the time of the bond issue. This was unusual – the vast majority of currency swaps are done at the existing currency rate, as Eurostat, the European Union’s statistics office, admits. The exchange rate was far worse than Italy could have obtained. It was losing a lot of money in the long term.
Also unusual was the interest rate on the swap – Libor minus 1,677 basis points. Such an interest rate was almost unheard of in the currency swap market. It meant the bank counterparty was paying Italy cash advances through quarterly payments.
You can see how the swap might be more of a loan than a currency hedge for Italy’s Euro-yen bonds. The country effectively would have received four cash advances because of the negative interest rate from the unnamed bank counterparty.But the swap had some peculiar features. The rate on the swap was Y19.30 to the lira, the exchange rate at the time of the bond issue. This was unusual – the vast majority of currency swaps are done at the existing currency rate, as Eurostat, the European Union’s statistics office, admits. The exchange rate was far worse than Italy could have obtained. It was losing a lot of money in the long term.
Also unusual was the interest rate on the swap – Libor minus 1,677 basis points. Such an interest rate was almost unheard of in the currency swap market. It meant the bank counterparty was paying Italy cash advances through quarterly payments.
Italy, we should note, always insisted the swap was just a way to lock-in foreign currency gains. Furthermore, they say, the thing would only have reduced the country’s debt by 0.02 per cent — not enough to make a difference for Italy’s eurozone-ambitions.
But there was the suggestion the swap was just one part of a series:
… these deals are usually part of a series and it is probable this was the case with the swap … If there were 10 of them, the cash from the deals would be enough to reduce the country’s debt by 0.2%, which was close to the amount Italy needed to reduce its deficit to GDP ratio in 1997.
Greece’s currency swap reportedly took place around 2002 — a year after the country joined the eurozone. In that respect it’s perhaps even more of a mystery than Italy’s.
Why did the country feel the need to fudge its deficit in 2002 specifically?
And why did Goldman Sachs reportedly want to help it do so?
The Spiegel report has a clue, at least on the Goldman point:
Goldman Sachs charged a hefty commission for the deal and sold the swaps on to a Greek bank in 2005.
Ouzo all around then.
Well, at least for Goldman, if not the Greek banks.
quicksilver
Forumer storico
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