Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi (1 Viewer)

Geller

Banned
Nuvole dense all'orizzonte....

EURO: JUNCKER LANCIA L'ALLARME SULLA "DERIVA" DELLE ECONOMIE UE
di WSI-AGI
"Un'unione monetaria non puo' durare a lungo se le attuali divergenze nei conti pubblici diventeranno troppo grandi". Le bugie di Bonaiuti (presidenza del Consiglio): "l'Italia e' fuori dalla crisi". E Draghi si dissocia.

Il presidente dell'Eurogruppo, Jean-Claude Juncker lancia l'allarme sulla deriva che rischiano di prendere alcune economie dell'Eurozona. "Dobbiamo stare attenti - dice Juncker al giornale Sueddeutsche Zeitung - che le attuali divergenze non si amplino. Un'unione monetaria non puo' durare a lungo se le attuali divergenze nei conti pubblici diventeranno troppo grandi".

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BONAIUTI, "NOI SIAMO FUORI DELLA CRISI, LO DICE L'UE"

(AGI) - Roma, 13 feb. - L'Italia e' fuori della crisi grazie al suo sistema di piccole e medie imprese. Lo ribadisce il sottosegretario alla presidenza del Consiglio Paolo Bonaiuti: "In Italia le piccole e medie imprese hanno sostenuto l'economia con grande elasticita'. Per questo l'Osce, il Fmi e l'Unione Europea hanno riconosciuto che l'Italia e' uscita dalla crisi".

L'Italia e' proprio tra i paesi a cui allude, senza nominarli, il presidente dell'Eurogruppo Jean-Claude Juncker, quando afferma che "un'unione monetaria non puo' durare a lungo se le attuali divergenze nei conti pubblici diventeranno troppo grandi". Ripetiamo quanto scritto qui su WSI: "La Grecia e' sotto attacco perche' ha un deficit al 13% del Pil; bene, ma che senso ha, a questo punto, quel parametro del 3% fissato dal Trattato di Maastricht? Il debito pubblico greco e' al 125% del Pil (quello dell'Italia al 118%) mentre le griglie europee parlano di un limite massimo del 60%. Allora: rivediamo tutti gli schemi e regole UE, oppure preferiamo salvare quei paesi "deboli" del Club Med oggi viziati e "drogati" dal loro finto benessere? Diciamo l'ovvio: sara' impossibile ottenere dalla Grecia e dagli altri stati P.I.I.G.S. il rientro nei parametri entro tempi rispettabili. Per questo l'euro e' una moneta ipervalutata mentre vale di fatto tanto quanto valgono i fondamentali del piu' tenue anello della catena, in questo momento la Grecia. Ogni catena si spezza sul suo link debole anche se gli altri anelli sono fatti di titanio indistruttibile. Crediamo quindi ci pensera' il mercato finanziario a smascherare l'ipocrisia dei nostri burocrati europei, nelle settimane che verranno.(l.c.)

In Eurolandia si sono aperte le porte della valuta euro a troppi Paesi ... per ragioni strettamente diplomatiche e politiche ... Ed ora emergono con forza le debolezze strutturali interne di alcuni Stati (come la Grecia, il Portogallo, e purtroppo anche l'Italia) che indeboliscono la moneta unica ! :rolleyes:

Se ne avvantaggerà sempre più il dollaro :up:
Questa è l'unica consolazione per l'investitore lungimirante che ha saputo differenziare gli investimenti su un paniere di valute. ;)

Ad ogni modo l'Europa supererà l'attuale crisi. E le più cupe previsioni, create ad arte dalla speculazione, non dureranno se non il tempo di speculare appunto.
Occhiali scuri ed occhiali rosa sono nella dotazione standard degli investitori professionali ... Loro se li mettono e se li tolgono con disinvoltura e cinismo per lucrare sul sentiment che va di moda in un dato momento, mentre alcuni rimangono ipnotizzati nel bene o nel male, prendono tutto sul serio e ... non si accorgono dei consueti giochi che regolano i mercati finanziari ... :rolleyes:
 

stockuccio

Guest
divergenze d'opinioni :D

'They Just Don't See It'

OK, time for a pop quiz.
When it comes to figuring out where things are headed, would you rather listen to these guys:
"U.S. Economy to Strengthen, Reducing Unemployment, Survey Says" (Bloomberg)
U.S. unemployment peaked in October and will retreat through 2011 as the economy strengthens, according to economists surveyed by Bloomberg News.
The world’s largest economy will grow 3 percent this year and next, more than anticipated a month ago, according to the median estimate of 62 economists polled this month. The jobless rate, which reached a 26-year high of 10.1 percent in October, will end the year at 9.5 percent.
Efforts to rebuild inventories, investments in new equipment and software and improving sales overseas will spur employment and household spending. Scant inflation will give Federal Reserve policy makers room to keep the target interest rate near zero through the third quarter, buying the economy enough time to reach a self-sustaining expansion.
“It’s a matter of time before strength in the economy effectively feeds on itself, with more employment leading to stronger spending, which in turn leads to more employment,” said James O’Sullivan, global chief economist at MF Global Ltd. in New York. “The key is going to be the business sector leading the way and consumer spending following.”
"U.S. to Grow 3 Percent This Year From Year Ago, Fed Survey Shows" (Bloomberg BusinessWeek)
The U.S. economy will grow 3 percent this year from a year earlier, faster than previously predicted, according to a survey of economists released today by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
The 42 respondents also expected a “slightly stronger labor market” this year than they did in the fourth quarter, the Philadelphia Fed said in a statement. The outlook for gross domestic product was more optimistic than the forecast in the fourth quarter of last year for 2.4 percent growth in 2010, it said. The U.S. unemployment rate will average 9.8 percent this year, the survey showed.
Or these guys [italics mine]:
"Corporate America Is More Pessimistic Than You Know" (Deal Journal)
Looking for an explanation for the deep freeze in merger & acquisition activity and the jittery stock market? Just ask the boards overseeing U.S. companies.
A whopping 66% of 1,200 corporate board members surveyed recently said U.S. companies wouldn’t return to “business as usual” until at least 2013, and will operate till then in an environment of sluggish sales and growth. Roughly 45% said the economy wouldn’t return to precrisis levels in terms of investment, employment and productivity before 2013, according to the survey, conducted by KPMG LLP, while 22% said it would come beyond 2014.
“Not withstanding what economists are saying about the recovery, we are hearing from board members that they just don’t see it,’’ says Mary Pat McCarthy, a KPMG vice chairwoman who oversaw the survey of directors at publicly traded companies of varying sizes across the U.S.
McCarthy spoke to Deal Journal this morning from Miami where KPMG was hosting a conference of primarily audit committee members of corporate boards. “We are hearing a steady drumbeat down here that a recovery is a way’s off,” she said.
Another concern among board members: That the cost-cutting and layoffs that have helped boost corporate profits are going to hurt companies in the long term. The survey found that 67% of the respondents said were most concerned that cost-cutting would drain a company’s employee talent.
Other concerns: 36% said they worried cost-cutting would weaken internal controls, 25% said it could raise the risk of fraud and 22% said they thought the integrity of financial reporting could suffer in the hands of leaner staffs.
Yeah, I thought so.
 

stockuccio

Guest
un altro pezzo di Zibordi



Allora: Markit.com è un sito di cui sono azioniste le "solite" banche, che registra quello che dette banche riportano sui prezzi e transazioni dei famigerati "Credit Default Swap", che loro e solo loro trattano, in modo opaco e non regolamentato, tipo delle scritture private. Vedi qui ad esempio fresca fresca la storia del nostro Paolo Pellegrini e John Paulson and the Greatest Pump and Short Fraud Ever sui CDO dei mutui suprime che da un idea di come funziona. Piccolo riassunto.

Paolo Pellegrini e John Paulson sono andati dalle Goldman, Deutsche, Morgan e hanno detto: "...vogliamo che ci create un derivato sull'indice dei mutui e ci mettiamo dentro però alcune centinaia di mutui che vi diciamo noi, prendiamo i più assurdi e marci, quelli fatti a immigrati e neri che non restituiranno mai, ma li misceliamo con altri in modo che il rating rimanga buono

...Poi voi a Morgan e Goldman e Deutsche andate da AIG e create assieme a loro che sono un assicurazione, un "assicurazione sui mutui" un Credit Default Swap su questo "Indice dei Mutui Marci e Senza Speranza fatti a Messicani, Hiatiani e Negri" (ma con un nome magari più rassicurante, tipo "High Yield Asset Backed Securities...")

....Avrai tante istituzioni che lo comprano, paga un 7%, ha un rating ancora discreto e ci compri un assicurazione sopra per sicurezza per voi lo emettete forse a 100, lo vendete ai vostri clienti a 100 e noi lo vendiamo simultaneamente subito short per 20 miliardi a 100.

....Sappiamo che crollerà a 50 centesimi, se va bene, noi quindi andiamo short un derivato che abbiamo costruito apposta assieme a voi sapendo che dentro è marcio e perderà il 50% facciamo miliardi, voi ci guadagnate un 2% sul controvalore della transazione che sono decine miliardi di controvalore e verso i vostri clienti direte che era difficile prevedere che il valore delle case possa scendere ecc..., AIG guadagna anche lei una commissione, ...e le istituzioni che se lo comprano fidandosi che è Citi, Morgan e Goldman che assime ad AIG e con il rating di Moody dicono che è assicurato... beh...


“Paulson and [partner Paolo Pellegrini] were eager to find ways to expand their wager against risky mortgages. Accumulating it in the market sometimes proved to be a slow process. So they made appointments with bankers at Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank (NYSE:DB), Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS), and other banks to ask if they would create CDOs that Paulson & Co. could essentially bet against.”


As Fiderer explains, Paulson asked the banks to create those CDOs “so that they could be sold to some suckers at close to par. That way, Paulson’s hedge fund could approach some other sucker who would sell an insurance policy, or credit default swap, on the newly minted CDOs. Bear, Deutsche and Goldman knew perfectly well what Paulson’s motivation was. He made no secret of his belief that the CDOs subordinate claims on the mortgage collateral were close to worthless. By the time others have figured out the fatal flaws in these securities which had been ignored by the rating agencies, Paulson could collect up to $5 billion..

Paulson not only initiated these transactions, he also specified the terms he wanted, identifying which mortgages would be stuffed into the CDOs, and how the CDOs should be structured. Within the overall framework set by Paulson’s team, banks and investors were allowed to do some minor tweakin.”

It is not clear which banks ultimately participated in Paulson’s scam, but Fiderer quotes Bear Stearns trader Scott Eichel as saying that his bank refused. “It didn’t pass the ethics standards;” Eichel said, “it was a reputation issue and it didn’t pass our moral compass^. We didn’t think we could sell deals that someone was shorting on the other side.” Bear Stearns’ moral compass was usually pointed towards the darker regions, but perhaps this is why Paulson subsequently became one of the more eager short sellers of Bear Stearns’ stock.

Fiderer continues: “Prior to 2006, there were not many opportunities for naked short selling on subprime securitizations. But in January of that year, investment banks launched a new product, which enabled Paulson to place those bets on a large scale. The ABX index, a sort of Dow Jones Average of subprime mortgage securities, facilitated benchmarking the price of credit default swaps.”

In fact, it was a black box company called the Markit Group that created the ABX index. The banks were minor shareholders in Markit Group and provided data. I have noted in a previous blog that the Markit Group is a dubious outfit to say the least, and there is good reason to suspect that the direction of the ABX index was influenced by hedge fund managers and their allies at the big banks. I do not have evidence that Paulson was one of those hedge funds, but authorities ought to be asking questions.

Fiderer goes on to suggest that bad loans to homeowners were a significant cause of the financial crisis. On this front, I disagree with him. Certainly, some mortgage lenders were unscrupulous, and there was a certain amount of predatory lending, but the conventional wisdom that this is what crashed the economy is simply false.

At the time that the mortgage securities markets began to go south in 2007, defaults on subprime loans had increased only slightly month-to-month, and were in fact considerably lower than in earlier years. In the second quarter of 2007, for example, only 7.7 percent of subprime loans were 30 days past due, slightly up from 6.76 percent in the second quarter of 2006, but considerably lower than the 9.9 percent in the second quarter of 2001.

The problem lied not in the loans themselves, but in the fact that the loans had been packaged (apparently, to a large extent, at the behest of John Paulson and perhaps other bearish billionaires) into fraudulent securities that were traded and probably manipulated by a select number of hedge funds and large banks. In a somewhat similar scheme, hedge funds often pump up the stock of public companies before initiating short selling attacks aimed at demolishing those same companies.

The economy was brought to its knees by a few powerful and eminently dirty players on Wall Street, not by poor people who had the temerity to buy themselves houses.
 

stockuccio

Guest
la Cina sta mollando il dollaro e non lo dice ?



Why Is There A $71 Billion Difference Between China's FX Reserves And... China's FX Reserves?

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 02/05/2010 20:06 -0500



Zero Hedge has been following the topic of Chinese FX reserves, and specifically their change over time, with great interest, as this (presumably) primarily dollar-denominated amount is the critical "dry powder" that our key foreign purchaser of Bonds, Notes and Bills uses when bidding on Treasury Auctions. Should China's FX reserves decline, or be forcibly diversified, the amount left over for UST purchases will be correspondingly less at a time when every UST auction could be the last should PDs, Indirect and Direct bidders not have enough bidding interest to cover growing supply. As China is very secretive about the composition of its FX reserve portfolio, there is usually a lot of guess work involved in tracking where and how the money flows. What we do know, according to a January 15th report by People's Bank of China (PBOC), is that in 2009 FX reserves increased by $453.1 billion to a total of $2.399 trillion... Or so we thought. Yesterday China's official State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) released an update on FX reserves, according to which FX reserves increased... by only $382.1 billion, a $71 billion differential from the PBOC's number. (an English translation of the SAFE page can be read here).
We quote from the PBOC's December 2009 Financial Statistics report:
At end-December 2009, China’s foreign exchange reserves reached USD2.3992 trillion, registering an increase of 23.28% year on year. In 2009, official foreign exchange reserves rose by USD453.1 billion, adding USD35.3 billion year on year. In December, foreign exchange reserves expanded by USD10.4 billion. At end-December, the RMB exchange rate stood at RMB6.8282 per USD.
Next we quote from SAFE:
China's international reserve assets of 393.2 billion U.S. dollars of change. Among them, foreign currency reserve assets of 382.1 billion U.S. dollars deal of change (excluding the exchange rate and price changes in the value of non-trading effect), special drawing rights increased by 108 million U.S. dollars in IMF reserve position increased by 3 billion dollars.
Even for China, this is a very large discrepancy and its existence could be due to several key reasons.

  1. FX rate calculations and mark to market result in a substantially negative impact on the actual notional of FX holdings. This is starkly at odds with expectations of how the PBOC operates, as pundits have long believes the PBOC's reserve data reflects not only exchange rates (these are FX reserves after all, not some Bank of America Level 3 asset) but also asset valuations. Indeed, if this is the true explanation, it casts into doubt all other PBOC data that is supposed to be adjusted for MTM differentials.
  2. There has been a "factual" discrepancy between the two reporting agencies, and the differential is a simple slip. In light of much speculation that China tends to misrepresent data, this would not be very surprising, although somewhat blatant, instance of being caught "red handed."
  3. The two numbers are correct, to the extent data is available. As SAFE is the primary custodian of actual FX data dissemination, there may have been a less than overt cash outflow, of which the PBOC was simply unaware. Whether the use of funds was buying and transferring bearer bonds from Italy to Switzerland, buying several tons of gold, or taking down several auctions as a direct bidder, we are confident China could have found a willing recipient of the cash.
  4. This indicates that China may have well diversified its existing FX base away from dollars far beyond what has been projected. The $71 billion is roughly 3% on the total FX reserves of $2.4 trillion. Analysts estimate that of China's FX holdings at least 66% is dollar-denominated, 20% is in euros, and the remainder is in secondary currencies such as JPY, GBP and CHF. Obviously there would be no MTM variation on the dollar denominated assets, and assuming the delta comes from euro holdings, a $71 billion variation on an estimated $480 billion in euro notional is a stunning 15% - this means that China has not accounted for virtually the entire change in the relative value of the EUR/USD pair over 2009.
We will follow the PBOC's future releases closely and superimpose SAFE data on them to see if the two numbers somehow miraculously converge. With China and the US rapidly approaching a full trade war detente, which would severely cripple the rate of growth of USD FX reserves, having a credible indication of just what the real FX number is, becomes increasingly relevant.



mah ... 'ufficialmente' pare di si Move Over China: Beijing Sells Whopping $34.2 Billion Treasuries In December As Japan Becomes Largest Official Holder Of US Debt | zero hedge
 

stockuccio

Guest
Si ma forte il calcio.

Il problema è che la grande occasione di nazionalizzare queste banche e rifondarle con delle regole diverse è stata persa il marzo scorso quando erano alla canna del gas.:(


spero i capoccia europei stiano lustrando gli stivali


What is John Paulson doing in Greece? By Kevin Connor • Feb 15, 2010 at 12:29 EST

Goldman Sachs’s Greek adventure got an in-depth look from the New York Times yesterday. The article extends on last week’s Spiegel piece, which reported that the bank helped Greece hide the true extent of its debt through the use of specialized derivative products. We first reported on the parallels between AIG and Greece in a post last week, following the lead of Zero Hedge. Entry into the paper of record means the story now has legs this side of the pond, and MIT economist Simon Johnson is arguing that Goldman Sachs is set to be blacklisted in Europe.
One question looming over this story: did Goldman position itself to profit from the Greek fiasco? Did it use its special knowledge of Greek’s hidden debt to build profitable bets on its future downfall and rescue? If the bank’s past behavior is any guide, the answer is yes. Ignoring the impending catastrophe (obvious from their vantage point), and failing to properly “hedge” (extract massive profits), would have been “irresponsible” (insufficiently greedy/corrupt) on the part of senior management.
Considering this, hedge fund king John Paulson’s role in Greece deserves far more scrutiny. I wrote about this last week, pointing out that they shared the same vulture flight pattern in Greece, but at the time did not realize that Paulson and Goldman actually partnered in executing massive and profitable bets against the subprime market. Are they doing the same with Greece?

News of Paulson’s fund taking large positions against Greek debt has barely risen above rumor in the English-language press, despite this article in a Greek daily, which says that Paulson is “orchestrating the pressure on Greek government bonds and the Euro,” and reports that Paulson has a team of 20-30 traders focused on Greece.
PH2010021002746.jpg
In Greece, protesters rally against the government's austerity measures. The banner reads "We are struggling to live."

A research firm is now calling Paulson the George Soros of derivatives markets, where the bulk of speculation against European debt and the Euro is happening; the Telegraph says that so far “no hedge fund has put its head above the parapet in this destructive trade,” but the rumor is that Paulson is behind it.
If Paulson is the hedge fund king behind the parapet, as rumored in English and reported in Greek, then it would seem fairly likely that Paulson and Goldman partnered — colluded? — to build profitable short positions against Greek debt. That Goldman was shepherding hedge fund client Paulson around Athens in recent weeks would seem to suggest that the bank and hedge fund are working together in Greece.
Paulson and Goldman have partnered before — on the subprime short trades that won them enormous profits in the midst of the housing crisis. Those trades have gotten a lot of attention, but the fact that Paulson and Goldman worked together to make it all happen has received much less ink. The story of Paulson’s investments is detailed in Gregory Zuckerman’s book, The Greatest Trade Ever. Goldman plays a prominent role, setting up the CDOs that Paulson would wager against, and then selling them to investors. The star Goldman trader who placed the bank’s winning bets against the subprime market, Josh Birnbaum, was reportedly in frequent contact with Paulson, at one point encouraging him to back off his bets (perhaps to make more room for Goldman).
Since Paulson was in the room with Goldman (and several other banks) when these CDOs were first conceived, it would seem that the fund had an unfair edge over the investors that would lose their shirt buying the securities. Zuckerman notes that Deutsche Bank suffered losses because it couldn’t find takers; that famous taker, AIG, may have been Goldman’s convenient solution.
These parallels raise obvious questions: was Paulson also in the room with Goldman before it tried to sell Greece on a new way to hide its debt this past November? As a hedge fund client of Goldman’s, did Paulson have special information about Greece’s true debt situation? Are Goldman and Paulson partnering, once again, to profit from the downfall of an entire country/continent?
 

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